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THE SINO-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT OF 1975: A COMPARISON WITH
OTHER NORTH-PACIFIC
FISHERIES AGREEMENTS
SoNG YooK HoNG*
I. INTRODUCTION

As the restrictions imposed on the Japanese fishing industry
by the Allied Powers were relaxed in early 1950's, the longstanding fishery disputes in the East Asian Seas began to reopen.
The fishery talks between China and Japan were directly
motivated by successive Chinese seizures of Japanese fishing
vessels operating off Chinese coasts in the Yellow and East China
Seas. The seizures began on December 7, 1950. As far as Japan
was concerned, it was desirable in the absence of formal
diplomatic relations to have such incidents avoided in every
reasonable way. 1 For a practical solution, an agreement between
the Fisheries Association of China (thP- Chinese Association) and
the Japan-China Fisheries Association of Japan (the Japanese
Association) Concerning Fisheries in the Yell ow and East China
Seas (the non-governmental arrangement) was first made in April
1955.2
* S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. The present paper was prepared
under the guidance of Professor Louis B. Sohn in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the S.J.D. The views expressed here are those of the author.
1. However, for a particular purpose, the form of the non-governmental
agreement has sometimes been used, in spite of maintaining diplomatic relations.
For example, the Japan-Indonesia Fisheries Agreement was made as a provisional
non-governmental agreement in order to avoid disputes over the Indonesian
archipelagic waters and 12-mile territorial sea measured from straight lines joining
the outermost islands. It was signed on July 27, 1968 at Djakarta between the
Director-General of Fisheries of Indonesia and the Representative of the National
Federation of Fisheries Association and the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries
Co-operative Association. See 17 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 136-7 (1973). Another nongovernmental agreement was made in accordance with Article 8 of the KoreaJapan Fishenes Convention on December 7, 1965 between Korean and Japanese
civilian fishing industries to deal with the safety regulation of fishing operation.
See Korean Office of Fisheries, A Collection of Decrees on the Korea-Japan
Fisheries Convention (in Korean) 135-39 (1968). Even under the present SinoJapanese governmental agreement, a new non-governmental arrangement
concerning the safety regulation and navigational rules, will be agreed between
the civilian Fisheries Associations of the two states. For details, see infra at text
accompanying note 105.
2. For convenience in making distinctions between the Sino-Japanese nongovernmental and governmental agreements, on the one hand, and between the
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In June 1958 when the first non-governmental arrangement
expired, the Chinese Association refused its renewal on account of
the unfriendly Japanese foreign policy toward China. Therefore,
there was no agreement between the two parties from June 1958
until December 1963 when the second arrangement came into
force. The second arrangement expired in December 1965, and was
replaced by a third one. The third arrangement of 1965 remained
in effect until June 22, 1975. 3
In late 1960's, Chinese fishermen began to show their interest
in seining operations off their coast. In December 1970, the
Regulation of the Chinese Association and the Japanese Association Concerning Purse-Seining with Lighting Ships (the nongovernmental seine fishing arrangement) was signed to deal with
newly arising problems of seine operations in the form of a
supplement to the third arrangement of 1965. As a result, from the
beginning until 1970, the three arrangements dealt with the
regulation of trawl fishing only; beginning in 1971, the operations
of seine fishing also have been r-egulated in a mutually agreed
upon form. 4
In accordance with Article 9 of the Joint Communique
between China and Japan, signed at Peking in September 1972,5
Japan has made many efforts to transform the non-governmental
arrangements into a governmental one before the former expired
on June 22, 1975. Eventually the governments of Japan and
China signed an Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the
People's Republic of China (the governmental agreement) on
August 15, 1975, at Tokyo, which replaced the earlier nongovernmental arrangement on December 22, 1975, when the
parties exchanged notes. 6
Sino-Japanese governmental agreement and the other fisheries agreements in the
North Pacific Ocean, on the other hand, three different terms are employed
hereafter. The "arrangement" will denote the Sino-Japanese non-governmental
agreement, while the "agreement" will refer to the Sino-Japanese governmental
agreement and the "convention" will mean the three fisheries agreements
concerning the North Pacific Ocean.
3. For the Sino-Japanese non-governmental fisheries talks, see infra note 65.
4. In this paper, trawlers represent the double-dragger and single-boat purseseines (Art. 2(1) of the third non-governmental arrangement) and seiners mean
purse-seiners with lighting ships (preamble of the non-governmental seine fishing
arrangement).
5. The Fishery Agreement was the fourth and last pending administrative
agreement to be signed between the Chinese and Japanese governments under the
China-Japan Joint Communique of September 1972. For the text of the
Communique, see 17 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 81-83 (1973).
6. Asahi Shinbun (a Japanese Daily), at 1 (December 22, 1975).
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Previously, Japan made several fisheries agreements with
other states such as the Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union,
Canada and the United States. But the governmental agreement
contains its own distinctive features, because it relates to a semienclosed sea, and was concluded at the turning point in the
history of the law of the sea, when the majority of the nations
were approaching a general consensus on the concept of a 200mile economic zone.
This paper intends to describe the general background of
fisheries in China and Japan and the structures of the previous
non-governmental arrangements; to compare the governmental
and non-governmental agreements; and to compare the governmental agreement with other fisheries agreements dealing with
the disputes over the North Pacific fishing grounds. An analytical
comparison will be made about the Chinese military zones with
some other maritime security zones and the legal connection of
the zones with the fishing rights will be discussed. Last, the paper
will analyze the possible influences of the present Agreement on
hypothetical situations arising from the advent of a 200-mile
economic zone, as applied to the East Asian Seas.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND

A. Geographical Facts
The legal problems of fisheries always have a close interrelation with the facts of geography. Thus, it may be useful to describe
the geographical factors which influence the fishery species in the
Yellow and East China Seas.
The Yellow Sea. Properties of the water in the region are
important factors affecting the habitats of fisheries. About 50% of
the suspended sediments in the Yell ow Sea is detrial clay and silt;
the rest is organic material derived from land areas or produced in
the sea from nutrients contributed by the rivers such as the
Yangtze, Yellow, and Liao Rivers of China and the Han, Taedong
and Yalu Rivers of Korea. 7
The East China Sea. The distribution of sediments is similar
to that of the Yellow Sea, i.e., silt and clay on the inner half and
sands of the outer shelf. 8
7. K. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of
the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea," 2 Tech. Bull. 13 (1969) (Bangkok,
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East-ECAFE).
8. See K. Emery, "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of
the East China and The Yellow Sea," 1 Tech. Bull. 13-17 (1968) (Bangkok,
Economic Commission for Asia and Far East-ECAFE).
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In addition, currents and tides are also influential fadors by
which the two fishing grounds have become richer in fisheries. A
stream of the North Equatorial current (black current) moves
northward through these regions up to the Pohai Bay of China; it
is some 300 kilometers wide and 200 meters deep, and moves at
the rate of 50 to 75 kilometers a day, depending on the wind and
the season. When it returns back to southward from Pohai Bay, it
flows along the mainland coast of China as a cold current, having
been cooled down by the Kamchatka Current (cold current)
flowing southward along the Siberian and Korean coasts. The
mixing of the warm current and the cold current produces
optimum fishing grounds. To this mixture of currents is added a
phenomenal tide, which is also an important factor of fishing life.
On the average, the difference between high and low tide along
the west coast of Korea is about six meters, with a maximum of
9. 7 meters at Inchon; along the east coast of China the difference
is about three meters, with a maximum of fifteen meters at
Hangchou Bay south of Shanghai. 9
These optimum conditions for a habitat of fisheries in the
Yellow Sea and the East China Sea have traditionally aroused the
interest of fishing industry, particularly those of Japanese who
long landed various fish in these grounds. Thus, disputes over
fishing rights in the regions are regarded as in part a natural
result of the geography which arouses competing interests of the
fishermen concerned.
B. Fi§Jhing

lindu§~li"Y

The fishing industry in China and Japan is of special
. importance. Fish is the most cheaply produced form of protein
food and a valuable supplement to these countries' diets. The
Japanese as well as the Chinese are less fastidious than
Westerners about the kinds of fish they eat. In view of world fish
catches, Japan has become the first magnitude state, while China
the second magnitude.

1. China
The Chinese fishing industry has not only been resuscitated
but also has been completely reorganized and expanded since the
establishment ofthe Peking regime in 1949. 10 The fishing industry
9. Korean Office of Fisheries, Fisheries in Korea 60-61 (Seoul, 1986).
10. See Ch'ing and Li, "The Problem of Increasing Fishery Production and the
Direction in Processing," 3 Hsin·hua pan-yuea·k' an (New China Semi-Monthly),
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was helped in several ways. The fishermen were instructed to
form cooperatives and, later, communes, and they were advanced
loans to build vessels and facilities such as trawlers, canneries
and fish-processing plants.n By improving of transportation of
fish production, vast fish markets were formed, and scientific
research on fisheries was not neglected. 12 The industry thus
became unified and centralized and, to a considerable extent,
modernized.
The fisheries of China may be classified into three categories,
viz., coastal, offshore and inland waters. Not many Chinese
people have traditionally ventured a fishing voyage far from their
coastal waters; hence, deep-sea fishing was not highly developed.
But coastal or inland fisheries, in contrast, have always been
highly developed. Due to coastal topography 13 and pressure of
population, 14 most of the Chinese fishermen have historically
engaged in the inshore fisheries since the eleventh century B.C.
The fresh-water fisheries account for about a third of the total
annual catch of fish.
Fish farming goes back two thousand years. The Yangtze
delta has been used for fish-breeding, especially the rearing of the
carp. The chief fishing bases here are Luta, Chefoo and Tsingtao.
The offshore fisheries, however, are best developed in the Chousan
No. 4, at 855 (1951) and Kao, "The Recovery and Development of Aquatic Products
Work," id. at 857.
11. See Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea," 63 Am. J. Int'l L.
49, particularly nn.lO, 11 (1969); H. Robinson, Monsoon Area: A Geographical
Survey 416 (1967).
12. For fishery research in China, see Western Pacific Fisheries Research
Comm'n., The Collection of Thesis of the 5th Annual Meeting (in Korean) 183-306
(published in North Korea, 1964). A multinational agreement between China,
North Korea, North VietNam, and the Soviet Union established this Commission
with some enforcement functions to draw up necessary measures in accordance
with scientific data for protecting and increasing fishery resources. For the text of
the Western Pacific Fisheries, Oceanology, and Limnology Research Cooperation
Agreement of June 12, 1956, see 87 Hsin-hua pan-yuea-k' an (New China SemiMonthly) 60-61 (published in PRC, 1956).
13. The total area of coastal and offshore fishing grounds to the depth of 200
meters along the coasts of China is approximately 1/2 million square kilometers,
which comprises as much as 23.7 percent of the world total and is therefore larger
than that of any other country. For details, see Park, "Fishing under Troubled
Waters: The Northeast Asia Fisheries Controversy", 2 Ocean Develop. Int'l L. J.
No. 2, 96, n.10 (1974).
14. Although Chinese fishery produces about 7 million tons annually, the total
catch in relation to the numbers of people, over 800 million, is relatively meagre;
the per capita output is small, hence the per capita consumption is not large.
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Archipelago, where Chousan is a great fishing center and market,
and along the greatly articulated south coasts (map 1). 15
2.

Japan

In Japan, there are two natural conditions by which many
Japanese people have been forced to engage in fishing industry. 16
One is the pressure on the available cultivable land, 17 and the
other is comparatively favorable conditions for coastal fisheries
due to the abundance of plankton and marine life arising from the
mixture of cold and warm waters.
Over 85% of the Japanese fishing industry is, like those of
Korea and South Africa, substantially regulated by laws. 18 The
Japanese regulations, however, are not as rigidly imposed and
inflexible as the centrally planned Soviet schemes. Nor are the
regulations as limited as in Canada and in the United States.
The fisheries may be classified, by location of fishing
grounds, into four categories, namely, the distant-water, offshore,
coastal and inland fisheries. The distant-water fisheries consist of
the large-scale mothership-type bottomfish fishery in the northern
Pacific, the bottomfish fishery in the Atlantic Ocean, the tuna
longline fishery (including skipjack pole-lining), and the
mothership-type salmon fishery and king crab fishery in the
northern North Pacific. The offshore fisheries comprise middleseized trawling, purse seining and other net fishing in the offshore
waters around Japan. The coastal fisheries include smaller-scale
operations by various types of gear. The fresh water fisheries are
not so conspicuously developed, compared with those of China. 19
For meeting the great home demand, approximately 90% of
the fish catch is presently consumed as food internally; the
remainder is used for the preparation of oil, meal and fertilizer. 20
15. For details, see Robinson, supra note 11, at 415-16.
16. For the number of persons engaged in fishing industry and number of
fishing enterprises, see The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, Fishing
Industry in Japan 15 (1968).
17. See Robinson supra note 11, at 508 et seq.
18. See Comitini, "Economic and Legal Aspects of Japanese Fisheries
Regulation and Control," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 179, especially n.1 (1967); W.
Herrington, "Operation of the Japanese Fishery Management System" (Occasional Paper No. 11, Law of the Sea Institute, U. of R. I.) at 3-10 (1971).
19. For recent Japanese fish catches, see Research Institute for Ocean
Economics, 6 Data for Marine Industry Research (in Japanese) No. 1, 31 (1975).
20. For example, even the isopod is sometimes eaten in Japan, though it is not
well suited for human consumption. See The New York Times, p. 56, col. 4
(January 13, 1976).
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(Map 1)

Majot Fishing Ports

Ningpo Marketing Centres
1,000,000
500,000
250,000
100,000
(Est. fish production in 1964 in metric tons.)
Sources:

H. Robinson, Monsoon Asia: A Geographical Survey 415 (1967)
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The consumption of fish per capita thus is the highest in the
world. 21

C. Political and Legal Need for Non-Governmental
Arrangements
The need for a fisheries agreement between Japan and China
was a regional problem in the East Asian Seas. It seems therefore
necessary to discuss the regional fisheries relations as a whole.
Japan, as a distant-water fishing nation, has traditionally caused
fisheries frictions with its two neighbors (Korea and China). The
regional disputes will be explained in the light of post "MacArthur
Line~' effects on the fisheries relations between Japan and China,
on the one hand, and between Korea and Japan on the other
hand.

1. Restrictions on the Japanese Fisheries
During the allied occupation of Japan (1945-52), the Japanese
fishing industry had been restrictively affected by several orders
of the Occupation Authorities. At the beginning, the orders were
intended to prohibit but later only to limit Japanese fisheries
within certain areas. The restrictive measures were implemented,
among others, by the so-called "MacArthur Line," by which
Japanese fishing activities were limited in terms of the period,
area, fishing instruments and species designated. The building of
fishing vessels was also under control.
Due to a food crisis in Japan, however, such restrictions soon
became lessened. On September 14, 1945, the first decree was
issued to allow Japanese fishing vessels -of limited capacity to
operate within 12 miles of the coast. 22 Again, on September 27,
21. See Office of the Prime Minister, Japan Statistical Yearbook 602 (1966).
For example, a comparative table shows the daily consumption of fish per capita
in 1964:
Protein
Food
Calories
Total (in grams)
1239.1
74.4
222.6
Fish (in grams)
86.3
17.5
116.4
22. There were a series of four decrees easing the restrictions during the first
two months: Sept. 14, 22, 27; Oct. 13. For further details, see 1949-1952 The Japan
Year Book 435-448 (Tokyo, 1952); Oda, "Conclusion of Non-Governmental Fishery
Agreement between Japan and the People's Republic of China," Jurist (in
Japanese) No. 84, 29-34 (1955); Ohira and Kuwahara, "Fishery Problems between
Japan and the People's Republic of China," 3 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 109, 109-110
(1959); Shutsugyono Tebiki-Nikkan Gyogyo Kyotei Kantai (Fishing Manual
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1945, the fishing zone was significantly expanded eastward to 150
degrees of east longitude and southward to 30 degrees of north
latitude. This line of delimitation was then called the "MacArthur
Line" (map 2). In June 1946, the second large-scale extension and
in September 1949, the third were made and thus the fishing areas
reached the central Pacific as far eastward as 180 degrees of east
longitude. Finally, in May 1950, tuna fishing was allowed as far
south as the Equator. The line of demarcation on the west between
Korea and Japan did not change to any significant extent because
of the narrowness of the Korea Strait (map 2).

The MacArthur Line
50

120

150

160

(Map 2)
170

180

•

40

JO
The Pacific Ocean

20

10

I

I

,--- -l

0

'

I

.........~ - - - -. - - - - ,... - -; - --!

I

'L

In about two years after surrender, many Japanese fishing
vessels were newly built, due largely to the positive support of the
Japanese Government. The total fishing capacity, with 57 otter
trawlers and 963 bull trawlers, exceeded by the end of 1951 that of
relating to Japan·Korea Fisheries Agreement) 146-147 (Tokyo, 1965); G. Weissberg,
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and the Japanese-Korean Fishery
Dispute 6-7 (1966); and Park, supra note 13, at 101-103.
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the pre-war peak of 1936. In this regard, it is interesting to note a
remark by some Japanese observers:
The natural outcome of the increase in the number of the
fishing-boats and the decrease in the catch within the
restrictive waters by the Orders of the Allied Powers, was for
such vessels to operate beyond the "MacArthur Lines." 23
This remark seems to indicate that even during the occupied
period, some Japanese fishing vessels had admittedly violated the
MacArthur Line.

2. The Need for Reconciliation
When the MacArthur Line was finally suspended in April
1952, the need for fishery talks among the East Asian countries
suddenly became serious. Similar circumstances occurred in the
other parts of the oceans where the Japanese fishing interests
were involved. In this regard, it was noted succinctly that "[t]he
near approach of peace with Japan necessitates careful consideration and prompt action with respect to Pacific Ocean Fisheries
relations." 24
The political relations among the three coastal countries
(Korea, Japan and China) were not ready to meet such newly
emerging situations. The effect of these relations on fishing was
evidenced soon by the intensification of the Chinese capture of the
Japanese fishing vessels operating off its coasts 25 and the Korean
"Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent
Sea."

23. See Ohira and Kuwahara, supra note 22, at 110.
24. See Bishop, "The Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement," 45 Am. J.
lnt'l L. 712 (1951).
25. The number of seized vessels and detained fishermen in December 1950July 1954 was illustrated as below:
Vessels
Crewmen
Vessels
Captured
Detained
Unreleased
1950
5
54
671
1951
55
1952
46
541
1953
24
311
1954
28
329
Total
158
1,909
Source: Ohira and Kuwahara supra note 22 at 111.

5
54
32
13
104
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3. Sino-Japanese Relations
Since the establishment of the Communist Government on the
mainland, Chinese leaders had adopted an anti-Japanese policy
by which Japan was regarded as an imaginary enemy nation.
This anti-Japanese policy was physically first shown by the
Chinese seizure of Japanese fishing vessels on December 7, 1950.
The seizures continued until August 1954, when the Sino-Japanese
fisheries talks were advanced enough to conclude the first nongovernmental arrangement.
Apart from the antagonistic policy issues between the two
states, there were two additional grounds causing the fishery
conflicts. As briefly shown above, the Chinese Government made
many efforts to reorganize and modernize its fishing industry. 26
As a result, with the advancement of fishing equipment, vessels
and skills, Chinese fishermen had begun to show increased
interest in the coastal fisheries and they wanted other fishermen
to stay off their coastal areas. On the other hand, Japan had
regarded the Yell ow Sea and the East China Sea together as one
of her eight coastal and offshore fishing grounds (map 3).
Needless to say, the two fishing grounds are the most important
areas to the Chinese. These were probably the most basic elements
naturally causing the fishery troubles between the countries
concerned.

4. Korea-Japan Relations
The main source of the dispute between the two states turned
out to be the Korean Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty
over the Adjacent Sea, made on January 18, 1952, which appeared
to be a "Korean version" of the Latin American claims to
extensive maritime jurisdiction. The extent of the Proclamation
ranged approximately 20 to 200 miles from the Korean coasts.
First of all, Korea believed that the Proclamation was
necessary for the preservation of peace. Its other purposes were
claimed to ·be: (1) to regulate all natural resources over, on and
beneath the continental shelf adjacent to Korean Peninsular and
insular coasts of the National Territory; (2) to prevent, in
particular, the exhaustible type of resources and natural wealth
from being exploited to the disadvantage of inhabitants of Korea,
26. For the efforts of the Chinese reed: et seq. QQvemment in this regard, see
Survey of China Mainland Press (hereinafter referred to as SCMP) No. 1032, at 52
et seq. (April 21-22, 1955).
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or decreased or destroyed to the detriment of the country; and (3)
to safeguard the principle of the non-interference with free
navigation of the high seas.27

Japan's Major Fishing Areas

(Map 3)

Okhotsk Sea

.

•

sa·~~

!
I
I
I

Pacific 1

Pacific 2

.·
East China
Sea 1

•
Source:

Pacific 3
Pacific 4
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.......
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Research Institute For Ocean Economics, 6 Data for Marine Industry
Research No. 1, at 34 (1975).

The most crucial issues in regard to the Proclamation seemed
two. 28 The first issue was whether there was so great a demand for
such a unilateral measure. Since the Proclamation intended to
27. For the full text of the Korean Declaration, see 2 U.N. Leg. Ser., Laws and
Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 30-1 (1957); U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/6, (1956).
28. For the discussions of these issues, see the Korean Bar Association, "We
Contend These: Concerning the Problem of Japanese Fishermen Who Violated Our
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cover jurisdiction over the natural resources even over the
continental shelf, it constructed a basis for Japan to argue that it
constituted a violation of the freedom of the high seas fisheries, an
established principle of international law. This was the weakest
point of the Japanese-Korean dispute, but one which Korea could
have defended. Thus Korea might have responded to it as follows:
The development of the law of the sea at that time was at such a
stage that even the International Law Commission recognized, in
1951, that "the existing law on the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas provided no adequate protection of
marine fauna against waste or extermination." 29 During the
Japanese occupation of Korea, Korea suffered severe damage from
the Japanese overfishing around its coasts; Korean coastal areas
were very badly depleted by the Japanese trawlers. Thus fisheries
in the areas were practically unproductive due to the destruction
of bottom feeding grounds and sea grasses. 30 Also, the right of
fishing on the high seas cannot be exercised without any
limitation. Its exercise is always accompanied by an obligation
imposed by the principle prohibiting an abuse of right. In other
words, any state enjoying the freedom of high seas fishing is
bound to refrain from any acts which may adversely affect the use
of the high seas by nationals of other states. 31 In consideration of
National Law," 4 Kor. J. Int'l L. No. 2, 136 (1959); the Japan Federation of Bar
Association, We Appeal Again to the Lawyers of the World: Illegality of "Rhee
Line" and Unlawful Arrest of Japanese Fishermen (1960); G. Weissberg, supra
note 22, at 4 et seq.; Park, supra note 13, at 102-5.
29. For details, see commentary to the Draft Articles of 1956 on the Law of the
Sea by the International Law Commission, reprinted in S. Bayitch, International
Law of Fisheries 87 (1957); For the development of fishery conservation in 1950's,
see Bishop, "The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas," 62 Col. L. Rev. 1206, 1213-16 (1962); Kury,
"The Fisheries Proposals: An Assessment," 12 San Diego L. Rev. 644, 650,
particularly n.23 (1975).
30. See H. Brittin, International Law for Sea-Going Officers 78-79 (1956).
Quite recently, Korean fishermen on the east coast (the Sea of Japan) seriously
complained of another gradual depletion of fishery resources by overfishing by
.Japanese fishermen operating in the Joint Regulation Zone. For details, see TongA llbo (Korean Daily), at 6 (Oct. 6, 1975); The Joong-ang Ilbo, at 7 (Nov. 7, 1975).
31. Of course, from the principle of the freedom of the high seas, there have
been several variations for various purposes, e.g., limitation of jurisdiction of, and
policing by, the coastal state; defense; protection of neutrality rights; coastal
navigation and commerce; customs inspection; protection against smuggling;
public health control; regulation and protection of fisheries; and exploitation of
subsoil riches. For further discussion on the variations, see T. Fulton, The
Sovereignty of the Sea 651-52 (1911), and for some state practice on the matter, see
P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 75-96 (1927).
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the past experience with respect to Japanese overfishing and the
understanding of the developmental stage of the law of the sea at
that time, Korea could have justified its marine policy on the
ground that the Proclamation of the "Peace (Rhee) Line" was an
exercise of right to take some anticipatory measures for the
prevention of another immediate possible overfishing by Japanese
fishermen around its coasts.
The second issue was whether the method and scope of the
Proclamation were "appropriate," once the necessity for the
Korean anticipatory measures was supposedly admitted. As to the
question of method, it would no doubt have been more desirable to
compromise the conflicting interests between the two countries,
rather than to take a unilateral action by a nation. When Korea
proposed to hold a fisheries talk in October 1951, Japan showed
no positive reaction. Then Korea suggested an interim measure for
recognizing the continued existence of some parts of the
MacArthur Line until the time of reaching a new fisheries
treaty. 32
When the Allied Powers started negotiations for the peace
treaty with Japan, Korea, from the beginning, made strenuous
efforts toward obtaining all possible assurances that its problems
with Japan would gain fair treatment by the treaty. As a result,
two articles are related, in part, to the Korean fisheries problems.
Article 9 obliged Japan to negotiate with the Allied Powers so
desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral fisheries
agreements on the high seas. Article 21 provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall
be entitled to the benefits of Article 10 and 14 (a)2; and Korea to
the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty." Also,
Article 25 provides, in part, that: "For the purposes of the present
Treaty, the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan,
or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a
State named in Article 23 . . . Subject to the provisions of Article
21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits
on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defmed." 33 In
accordance with Article 25, Korea was not a party to the treaty,
but by virtue of a proviso of the Article 21, Korea was conferred
the right to enjoy the status of a third party beneficiary provided
32. See, Byonggi Min, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Korea-Japan
Relations," Korean Quarterly, combined issue of No.4, Vol. 7 and No. 1, Vol. 9, at
93 (1966-1967); Tong-A llbo (Korean Daily), July 28, 1951.
33. See Allied Powers-Japan Treaty of Peace, reprinted in 46 Am. J. Int'l L.
Supp. 71-86 (1952); 136 U.N.T.S. 45 (1953).
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in Article 9. Thus Korea was entitled to demand as much right,
title or interest in relation to Japan as the Allied Powers were
entitled to as far as fishing interests, among other things, were
concerned. 34
On the one hand, Japan actually performed, regardless of the
voluntariness of it performance, the relevant treaty obligations in
relation to Canada and the United States by accepting the socalled "principle of abstention." 35 On the other hand, in relation to
Korea, Japan was not as faithful to its pertinent obligation of the
Treaty; she also raised technical objections to some parts of the
substantial Korean proposals for fishery talks. 36
In addition to those pending political and legal considerations, Korea was seriously faced with maritime security problems
during the period of 1950-1953 when it was involved in the
conflict with the northern part of its Peninsula. Under such
stalemate circumstances, the method taken unilaterally by Korea
might be possibly understood in terms of urging the other party to
observe the international minimum standard for conservation of
marine resources, thus preventing another threat of extermination
of fishery stocks, and securing the war-time safety around Korean
coasts. There remained, however, room for arguing whether the
scope of the Proclamation was acceptible to the community of
nations in light of international law of the time. From Korea's
viewpoint, there was no doubt that some sort of conservation
measures should be taken under those circumstances. But it was
also conceivable that Korea might have had a much better chance
of obtaining "universal acceptance" from the majority of nations
if it had more seriously considered the maximum limit of the Line.
Finally, as a practical matter, the ability of the Korean police
patrol ships was not sufficient to enforce the whole Proclamation
area. 37 As a result, even in practical sense of national interest, it
did not appear that the Proclamation had served its national
benefits as much as had been intended.
34. AB regard the status of Korea in relation to the Treaty, see J. Dulles,
"Records of Proceedings, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan", U.S. State of Dept's Pub. No. 4392, at 84-5 (1951); W.
Bishop, International Law, Cases and Materials 146 (1971).
35. See International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. No. 2770, 80 (1955).
36. Korea probably regarded it as one of the Japanese precedents showing that
Japan tends to possess stronger attitudes toward the weak, and weaker attitudes
toward the strong.
37. In 1952 when the Peace Line was proclaimed, Korean patrol ships could
seize only ten Japanese fishing vessels with 132 fishermen, while as many as 2,400
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It may be noted, by the way, that since the Korean-Japan
Fisheries Agreement of 1965, the issue about the validity of the
Peace Line has in a practical sense been dead, even though the
Korean Government has never officially suspended it, since the
Line was tacitly modified by the Joint Regulation Zone and the
Joint Fishery Resources Survey Zone in accordance with the
Agreement without regard to its validity. 38

D. Attitude Toward Coastal Jurisdiction
China and Japan have adhered to different practices with
respect to coastal jurisdiction. 39 The practices in fact reflect the
differently emerging national interests of each state. In general,
the contracting states' views on the coastal jurisdiction determine
the character of fisheries agreements. It seems therefore useful to
describe briefly, among other things, the historical background of
the adoption of each country's policies with respect to the
territorial sea limit and their current views on the issue.
1.

China

China has utilized the law of the sea for over a century in
order to secure its maritime zones by obliging other states to
refrain from unwanted military action in whatever coastal waters
can legitimately be claimed as Chinese. 40 In 1930, long before
vessels with 38,000 fishermen were estimated to be operating within the Line. For
detailed statistics see Park supra note 13, at 103 and Korean Government,
Commentary on the Treaties and Conventions between Korea and Japan 47, 56
(1965).
38. For details, see infra text accompanying notes 143-49.
39. See Park, "Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the East China
Sea," (Occasional Paper 15, Law of the Sea Inst., U. of R. I., 1972); Park, "Oil
Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy," 14 Harv.Int'l
L. J. 212 (1973); Mitchel, "The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East
China Sea," 51 Oreg. L. R. 789 (1972); Goldie, "The International Court of Justice's
'Natural Prolongation' and the Continental Shelf Problems of Island," 4 Neth.
Y.B. Int'l L. 237 (1973); Note, "International Law and the Sino-Japanese
Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands," 52 Boston L.
Rev. 763 (1972); Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-t'ai
(Senkaku) Islands and the Law of the Territorial Acquisition," 14 Vir. J. Int'l L.
221 (1974); Park, "The Sino-Japan-Korean Sea Resources Controversy and the
Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," Harv. lnt'l L. J. 44 (1975); Chiu, "China
and the Question of Territorial Sea," 1 Int'l Trade L. J. 29 (1975); Chiu, "Chinese
Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in
Southeast Asia," Occasional Papers! Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian
studies (Univ. of Md. Law School), No. 1 (1977).
40. See 1 J. Cohen and H. Chiu, People's China and lnt'l L. 467 (1974). It is
interesting to note that the Chinese concept of coastal jurisdiction seemed to be
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China was split into the People's Republic and the Republic of
China (Taiwan), China claimed a three-mile territorial sea. Since
then, Taiwan has never changed its policy of the breadth of the
territorial sea. Following the establishment of the PRC on the
mainland, in October 1949, the Chinese territorial sea limit was
not made public until September 1958, when China issued the
Declaration on the Territorial Sea, which reads in summary as
follows:
(1) The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic
of China shall be twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile =
1.852 kilometers); (2) the straight baseline method shall be
adopted to delimit the breadth of the territorial sea; (3)
Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghue, the
Tungsha, the Chungsha, the N ausha Island and all other
islands shall belong to China; (4) the water areas inside the
baseline, including the Pohai Bay and Chiung Chow Straits,
are Chinese inland waters.41
From the Chinese point of view, this Declaration was an
important measure for national security and economic interests.
China suggested three reasons for the Declaration: (1) under
international law every nation has the right to extend its
territorial sea up to twelve miles; (2) each nation is free to
determine its territorial limits, since there is no universally
recognized breadth of the territorial sea; and (3) the three-mile
limit of the territorial sea has long become obsolete. 42
As far as the numerical extension of the twelve-mile limit is
concerned, it seems useless at this moment to discuss the pros and
cons of the Chinese justification, since a majority of nations have
already claimed or shown their willingness to support the twelvemile limit. 43 It does not, however, necessarily mean that state
expressed in terms of "whatever coastal waters can legitimately be claimed as
Chinese." Cf. infra, text accompanying notes 52-54, 69-71.
41. "Declaration of the Chinese Government on China's Territorial Sea,"
NCNA-English, Peking (Sept. 4, 1958), in SCMP No. 1849; Peking Review 21 (Sept.
9, 1958); U.S. Dep't of State, Int'l Boundary Studies, Series A. No. 43, Limits in the
Seas, Straight Baselines of People's Republic of China (1972).
42. For a discussion of these three conventions, see Editorial Comments,
"Chinese Views on the Law of the Sea: Selected Aspects," 12 Indian J. Int'l L. 6079 (1972).
43. For the current data relating to the number of states claiming each
specified breadths of territorial waters, see the latest revision of "National Claims
to Maritime Jurisdictions," U.S. Dep't Of State, Limits in the Seas series (No. 36).
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practice and theory have not been diversified on the question
whether a twelve-mile breadth is sanctioned by customary
international law.44
What is most controversial at this juncture is the method of
drawing the straight base line and limiting inland waters. The
Chinese base line was drawn by the straight lines connecting
base-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost of the
coastal islands. Thus the water area extending twelve nautical
miles outward from this base line is China's territorial sea, and
the areas inside the base line are inland waters.
It may be said that the drawing of the base line and thus the
setting of the boundaries of internal and territorial waters are
primarily a function of combined geographical and predispositional factors. 45 But the geographical factor has generally been
given more weight than the dispositional factor. Chinese coasts
are, of course, so irregular and indented that, on the mainland
alone, they run to almost 11,000 kilometers (km). Along its coastal
and offshore areas are found 3,416 islands, over two-thirds of
them in the coastal waters of the East China Sea. It might also be
true that the food supply for the Chinese coastal inhabitants had,
in some measure, depended on the coastal fisheries in the past.
Furthermore, it might be recognized that the future anticipated
dependence of the coastal inhabitants' nutrition on the coastal
fisheries is likely to increase conspicuously. In spite of all of these
factors, it would not be easy to determine whether these Chinese
geographical and predispositional factors along the entire coastal
line would constitute a special circumstances in which such a
deviation could be justified. 46
In some places like the southern section where the coastline is
deeply indented or dotted with a fringe of islands (map 4, infra),
According to it, 29 states claim three miles, 52 states twelve miles, and 9 states 200
miles.
44. See McDougal and Burke, "The Community Interest in a Narrow
Territorial Sea: Inclusive versus Exclusive Competence over the Oceans," 45
Cornell L. Q. 171 (1960); Oda, "The Extent of the Territorial Sea: Some Analysis of
the Geneva Conferences and Recent Developments," 6 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 7 (1962);
Freeman, "Possible Solutions to the 200-Mile Territorial Limit," 7 Int'l Lawyer
387 (1973); G. Knight, The Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents, and Readings 329
(1975-76 ed.).
45. M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 306 (1962).
46. For the affirmative answers, see Cheng, supra note 11, at 58; for negative
answers, see the reactions of the United States and Great Britain, found in the U.S.
Dep't of State, For. Policy: Current Documents 1198 (1958) and The Time at 6 (Sept.
6, 1958) respectively.
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the method of straight baselines may be accepted with the
possible exception of a dispute as to the proper length of the
straight base line. 47 In some other places, such as the northern
parts where the coasts are straight, or gently rounded, the
adoption of straight base lines may not be reasonable. In the
Chinese coastline, therefore, it seems suitable to employ the
method of mixed base lines, i.e., drawing the base line in tum by
the methods of low-water line and straight base line to suit
different conditions. 4B
As to the claim that its bays and straits are internal waters,
China seemed not to pay much attention to the existing law of
nations. 49 Some Chinese bays may involve the problems of
definition, distance of a closing line, methods of drawing a
straight base line, the status of islands at the mouth of a bay,
etc. 5° According to the Chinese claim, those problems did not arise
since the whole water area inside the straight base line is to be
regarded as internal waters. Furthermore, China also maintained
that Pohai Bay was a "historic bay." 51
The basic Chinese position on the limit of territorial sea taken
in the Declaration of 1958 was reiterated in China's first address
at the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee on March 3, 1972,52 and it was
confirmed at the "Caracas Conference." 53
The Chinese policy on the coastal jurisdiction, which can be
decided by the coastal state subject to the requirements of
reasonableness and necessity, has been unchanged from the
beginning. Thus it seems consistently short of the noble
4 7. See Articles 3, 4(1) and (4) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone; the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep.
128-134.
48. For mixed baseline, see Art. 6(2) of Part II of the Informal Single
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Part II at 6 (1975). This
paragraph of the article was proposed by China.
49. See Art. 7(1)-(5) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone.
50. See Hurst, "The Territoriality of Bays," 3 Brit. lnt'l L. 42 (1922-23); for the
explanation of the specific bays around the world, P. Jessup, supra note 31; at 373439; Shalowitz, "The Concept of a Bay as Inland Waters," 13 Surveying and
Mapping 432 (1953); L. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in International Law 16-26,
especially 97-98 (1964); Hodgson and Alexander, Towards and Objective Analysis
of Special Circumstances (Law of the Sea Inst., Occasional Paper no. 13) 3-22
(1972).
51. For Chinese claim over historic bay, see Cheng, supra note 11, at 61,
particularly nn.75, 76.
52. U.N. Doc. AIAC.138/SR.72 (1972); 11 lnt.l Legal Mats. 654 (1972).
53. For details, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.25, at 6 (1974).
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understanding that the delimitation of sea area always has
international aspects, and should be acceptable to the majority of
nations. 54
2.

Japan

As soon as Japan's door was opened to the Western states by
the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Amity (Perry's Treaty)
with the United States in 1854,55 Japan encountered the problem
of defining the breadth of the territorial waters. When the
Crimean War extended to the seas of the Far East, the belligerent
states made clear their intention not to engage in hostilities
within the range of a cannon shot from the Japanese coasts. 56
Thus Japan was in some measure acquainted with the necessity
for adopting the Western concept of the breadth of the territorial
sea to observe the rule of neutrality under international law in
time of war. It was not, however, until 1870 that Japan adopted
the three-mile limit of the territorial sea, when it was again
involved in the problem of neutrality at the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussiari War (1870-71). 57 In order to adjust itself to these
new circumstances, the Meiji Government, after some trial and
errors, on August 29, 1870, finally enacted Neutrality Regulations
and issued a Proclamation of Neutrality containing a policy of the
breadth of the territorial sea, by providing in Article 1 that:
The contending parties are not permitted to engage in
hostilities in Japanese harbours or inland waters, or within a
distance of three ri from land at any place, being the distance
to which a cannon-ball can be thrown. Men-of-war or
merchant vessels will, however, be allowed free passage as
heretofore. sa
This policy of narrowing the limit of territorial sea to three
miles was in accord with the Japanese national interest in
54. See the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Cases, supra note 47 at 132.
55. For the general background, see 1 P. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between
the United States and Japan 1853-95 (1932); for the text of the Treaty, see 6 H.
Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America,
Documents 152-172: 1852-55, 439 et seq. (1942).
56. See "Neutrality" [Non-Intervention], found in Kozai's unpublished paper
on Breadth of the Territorial Sea.
57. 3 Dai Nippon Ciaiko Bunsho (Diplomatic Documents of the Great Japan)
12, found in id.
58. 1 F. Deak and P. Jessup, A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and
Treaties of Various Countries 736-7 (1939).
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obtaining more food and other raw materials from the oceans
than any other country.59
Beginning in 1973, the major Japanese ocean policies vividly
began to be challenged by the new trends in the law of the sea.
The first Japanese response appeared, in March 1973, at SubCommittee II of the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee indicating that "it
would consider the issue of a twelve-mile territorial sea to be of
second importance compared with the other related problems of
areas adjacent to the territorial sea." This position became more
dermite at the "Caracas Conference" on the Law of the Sea. 60
Quite recently, on March 30, 1977, the Japanese Government
announced that it would expand its three-mile territorial sea limits
to twelve miles and that it also would adopt a 200-mile exclusive
fishing zone. 61
III. STRUCTURE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS

The non-governmental fisheries arrangements usually consisted of a main text, four to five appendices, two memoranda, and
two exchanges of letters. 62 The main features of the arrangements
were to place an emphasis on the safety regulation of fishing
operations and on the establishment of various regulated (fishing
or security) zones. Throughout the treaty period, China had
enforced strict regulation of the military zones, and fishing zones
in general had remained unchanged with slight expansion. 63
Enforcement measures were based on flag state jurisdiction in
relation to trawl fishing and on mutual jurisdiction in relation to
seine fishing. But this jurisdiction was not strong enough to
control violations. The provision for dispute settlement was not
well framed and thus there was no way for solving disputes in
case each party had a different view on the matter. Free
navigation in the fishing zones was at all times safeguarded.
59. For details, see Nihon Keizai Shinbun (a Japanese Language Economic
Daily), at 9 (Sept. 17, 1974); for general statement in this regard, see U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/SR.44, at 12 (1974).
60. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.41, at 13 (1974).
61. See Tong-A Ilbo (a Korean Daily) at 1 (March 30, 1977); The New York
Times at A 5 (March 30, 1977).
62. For the text of the first arrangement of 1955, see B. MacChesney, 51
International Law Situation and Documents 1956: Situation, Documents and
Commentary on Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea 368-70
(1957); and for its appendixes, exchange of letters and memoranda, see 2 Korea J.
Int'l L. 150-159 (1957). For the text and its attached documents of the third
arrangement of 1965, see SCMP, No. 3613, 27-42 (January 10, 1966).
63. For expansion, see map 4 infra.
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The arrangements were, in form, non-governmental and
provisional but, in function and operation, were comparable to a
formal treaty or standing agreement. 64 The forms and the
substance of the non-governmental and governmental fisheries
agreements are quite similar. At this point, therefore, the chief
components of the non-governmental arrangements will be
described, with discussions limited to a few legal issues which do
not coincide with those of the governmental agreement, in order to
64. For the problems concerning the negotiations of the first fisheries
agreement, see Ohira and Kuwahara supra note 22, at 109-25 (1959); for
discussions on the non-governmental arrangements, see Park supra note 13, at 110-22; for the non-governmental fisheries talks, see the following table:
Evolution of the Non-Governmental Arrangements
Effective
Period

Regulating
Fisheries

Peking

One year
One yearrenewed

Trawl fishing

By exchange
of notes

"

"

Conferences

Date

Place

1st
2nd

06~13-55

06-13-56
06-13-57

3rd

06-13-58
01-04-63

4th
5th

12-23-63
12-23-65

"

12-23-67

By exchange
of notes

12-23-68
12-23-69

"
"

6th

06-23-70

Peking

7th

12-31-70

"

06-23-72
8th

06-23-73
06-24-74
06-22-75

Peking

Invalid
Agreed to
hold a talk
by the end
of the year.
Two years
Two yearsrenewed
One yearrenewed

"

Trawl fishing

"
"

By exchange
of notes

Six monthsrenewed
Two yearsrenewed
One and a
half years
One yearrenewed

Trawl and seine
fishing

Peking

"
"

"
"

Seine fishing

Expired

Source: Hae-woe Soo-san Jung-bo (Overseas Fisheries Information, a
Korean Fisheries Monthly) 49 (Jan. 1975).
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avoid overlapping discussion in the following sections IV and, in
part, V.

A. Fishing Zones
As regards the delimiting of fishing grounds, the original
Chinese idea was to create three areas. The area west of the 124th
eastern longitude would be designated for the Chinese fishermen
only; that east of the !25th for the Japanese fishennen exclusively; and the buffer zone between the 124th and 125th eastern
longitude for joint controls. Japan opposed the idea because it
excluded the Japanese fishermen from large high seas areas (the
longest distance from the Chinese coasts ranges about 150 miles)
and it would have weakened the Japanese position in fisheries
relations with other countries. In order to compromise the
conflicting interests, Japan and China agreed that the fishing
vessels of both sides might operate at the same time, but the
fishing areas were to be divided into small areas and the fishing
period was to be short and the number as well as, in some cases,
the horsepower and luring lights of fishing vessels were to be
limited. In allocating the areas, a particular consideration was
given to protecting the special interest of China existing solely by
reason of geographical adjacency. In addition, certain waters were
to be closed to all fishing for security reasons. 65 Yet the Japanese
gained considerable benefit from the allocation since the final
lines were more advantageous to them than those under either the
original Chinese proposal or the later governmental agreement.
Trawling Operations. Six principal trawl fishing zones
were established (map 4). Each fishing zone was specifically
regulated by way of limiting the maximum number of trawlers
and the fishing period.
A memorandum also delineated a fishing area (memorandum
zone) densely inhabited by fish and located in the central part of
the Yellow Sea (map 4). In order to prevent a serious decline in
fishery productivity, the number of trawlers there was limited to
eighty during the four months of October, November, January,
and February. This zone was established by a Chinese unilateral
suggestion in a form of memorandum. Nevertheless, the Japanese
Association unreluctantly accepted it by merely pointing out that
it would be in the mutual interest to preserve fishery production.ss
65. For details, see infra, text accompanying notes 191-92, 209.
66. See Article 1 of the main text and appendix 1 of three non-governmental
arrangements.
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The Sino-Japanese Non-Governmental Fisheries Arrangements
(Map 4)
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By means of an exchange of letters, an area (the trawl fishing
prohibited zone) was designated wherein trawl fishing would be
prohibited (map 4). 67 This created a source of potential difficulty
since it was not an area covered by the non-governmental
arrangements but in fact was an area excluded from the
arrangements by a Chinese domestic law. It was a provisional
conservation measure subject to alteration by general provisions
to be made by the respective govemments. 68 By establishing the
zone, the Chinese view turned ou..t to be similar to that of Russians.
Each declared that a coastal state should establish its own regime
over its neighboring waters in accordance with the need to protect
the economic interests of the nation 69 and that a state's
conservation measures belong to its domestic affairs and do not
require the concurrence of another state. 70 In this case also, the
Japanese were not daring enough to reject the Chinese unilateral
action on the ground that it encroached upon freedom of the high
seas. 71 As a result, all Japanese and Chinese trawlers were
prohibited from conducting operations throughout the year in the
conservation zone.
Moreover, trawlers were required to observe the other
conservation measures, in terms of restrictions on the sizes of
young fish and net, and on the amount offish catches. 72 Trawlers
also had to observe a vague rule which stated that "trawlers must
move to another fishing ground when they meet concentrations of
young fish." However, the rule was not explicit as to the degree of
concentration of young fish. Therefore, it was not clear from the
provision how trawlers had to abide by the rule. From the point of
view of enforcement measures, this rule seemed meaningless since
67. See the memoranda exchanged by the Fisheries Association of both sides
on December 17, 1965, attached to the third non·govemmental arrangement ..
68. It was drawn by the Fisheries Management Bureau of the East China
Military Administration Committee on December 16, 1956.
69. In March 1956, the Soviet Union proclaimed the "Bulganin Line" whereby
provisional conservation measures were adopted to limit the fishing zone, to
designate the annual maximum amount of catches, closed seasons for fishing and
fishing instruments, and to stipulate a penal provision for the violation of these
regulations. For further discussion, see Ohira, "Fishery Problems Between Soviet
Russia and Japan," 2 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 10-13, particularly 9 (1958).
70. S. Oda, Kaiyono Kokusaiho Kozo (Structure of the Law of the Sea), 129
(1956).
71. See Letters exchanged in connection with the third non·govemmental
arrangement.
72. In the first and second non·govemmental arrangements, there was no
provision regulating the size of the mesh of trawl nets and the size of young fish.
The third arrangement first dealt with the conservation of young fish.
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the non-governmental arrangements did not provide for an
enforcing agency. 73

Seining Operations. The seine fishing arrangement of
197074 was, in form, a supplement to the existing third arrangement, but it was a separate and unique agreement in terms of
function and substance. It designated three seine fishing areas
(areas A, B, and C on map 4). Conservation measures for seiners
were more restrictive than those for trawlers. In addition to the
orthodox regulations concerning the number of vessels, areas and
seasons 75 as well as concerning the sizes of young fish and nets, 76
seiners had to observe regulations relating to horsepower and
luring lights of vessels. The maximum capacity of the main
engine of each seiner was limited to 660 horsepower, and the
maximum luminosity of the lights for luring fish was restricted to
10,000 candles. Each team of seiners operating with lighting ships
was allowed two such ships.

B. Regulation of Safe Fishing Operations
The provisions for maintaining orderly fishing operations
were explicitly expressed in each arrangement. These may be
noted since the Japanese gave their own implied significance to
the meaning of the safety regulations by interpreting them to
mean that the regulation made their vessels secure from seizure.

Trawling Operations. Trawlers were obliged to observe
two kinds of safety regulations: (1) the treaty regulations
stipulated by the non-governmental arrangements, and (2) the
international navigational rules recognized by their govern-

,

73. See Clause 1 of the seine fishing arrangement; for discussion on
enforcement measures, see infra, text accompanying notes 81-91.
74. For the text, see SCMP, No. 4811, 234-39 (Jan. 4-8, 1971).
75. On June 21, 1972 when the arrangement was first renewed, the number of
Japanese vessels was increased to eighty (sixteen teams). And the numbers
remained equal after the increase of June 21, 1972. For details, Clause 1 of the
seine fishing arrangements.
76. Fish smaller than those stipulated were supposed to be landed in excess of
15% of a haul. Otherwise, the haul was requested to be promptly put back into the
sea and fishermen should move to another fishing ground. It was not, however,
explicit as to whether "fifteen percent of a haul" meant a haul from the same
species or from any kind of species. With regard to this question, the provision of
the trawl fishing arrangement left no doubt by describing a haul from the "same"
species.
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ments. 77 It was not known what rules of the international
navigation were accepted by each government. On that question,
China seemed especially selective, advocating or renouncing some
principles of international law when such action inured to her
benefit. At the "Geneva Session" of the Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea in May 1975, the Chinese attitudes toward the
principles of international law were, in part, elucidated by her
delegate stating that:
His delegation disagreed with the general and indiscriminate
references to ... the rules of international law. Many of
those rules had been established before the majority of
developing countries became independent and did not
conform with their interests. The world had changed, and
developing countries could not be asked to accept out-of-date
hiws. 78
The other treaty rules that trawlers were required to observe
were safety regulations concerning methods of marking vessels,
giving signals, fishing operations and making way for each
other. 79

Seining Operations. The safety regulations of seiners were
simpler than those of trawlers. Seiners also were required to
observe two kinds of safety regulations: (1) the treaty rules
stipulated by this seine fishing arrangement and (2) the international navigational practice. The present treaty rules dealt with
methods of markings and rules for fishing operations. The ways
for using of luring lights were especially stipulated in terms of a
distance measured between one vessel and the other. 80 As far as
the international navigational rules were concerned, however,
seiners were required to abide by more broad regulations since
they had to observe all the international navigational rules,
regardless of their being recognized by the Contracting States
respectively.
77. In regard to the international navigational rules, the first and second
arrangements required compliance with all the international rules, while the third
one required only compliance with certain rules recognized by their governments.
Compare appendix 2 of the first arrangement with appendix 3 of the third
arrangement.
78. See U.N. Doc. 62/C.3/SR.21, at 10 (1975).
79. For details, see Clause I-IV of the appendix 3 of the third arrangement.
80. See Clause (1) and (2) of the seine fishing arrangement.

28

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

C. Enforcement Mea.suYes
There were two different enforcement methods for trawlers
and seiners.

Trawling Operations. Enforcement measures of the first
and second arrangements were identical to each other. Therefore,
further discussion will be based on the first and third arrangements. The first arrangement envisaged three categories: (1)
infractions of the number of vessels and the limit of the fishing
zones; (2) disputes between trawlers of the two parties; and (3)
damage inflicted on the vessels in violation of safety regulations.
The third arrangement regulated violation of the size of catchable
young fish, in addition to the first and third categories under the
first arrangement.
In the event of violation of regulations concerning the number
of vessels and the limit of fishing zones, any trawlers, when the
infraction was discovered, were obliged to report the violation to
the Fisheries Association of the foreign vessel through their own
Fisheries Association. In other words, there was no official
inspection agency. Each Fisheries Association was responsible
only for taking action against violation by its own vessels upon
receipt of such a report. Sanctions against violation under the first
arrangement were warning or punishment, but they were not
specified later in the third arrangement. The only obligation of the
Fisheries Association under the latter arrangement was to take
prompt, effective and proper action. 81 Of course, no provision was
made as to what actions ought to be considered "prompt, effective
and proper."
The disputes between the vessels of the two parties were dealt
with only by the first arrangement. The disputes were to be settled
by mutual discussion or decision reached on the spot. This unique
method of dispute settlement seemed an oriental form of a
gentleman's agreement, which might have been conceived in a
thought of emphasizing courtesy. If the disputes could not be
solved in either way, both Fisheries Associations were obliged to
take mutual action to settle them after investigating the actual
situation. 82
In the event of collision or damage to the vessels due to nonobservance of operational safety rules, under the third arrangement the trawlers involved were to take prompt steps to safeguard
81. Art. 7(1), id. and Art. 6(1) of the first arrangement.
82. Art. 6(2) of the first arrangement.
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the damaged vessels and, whenever possible, they had to consult
the other vessels on the spot and to exchange written statements.
The first arrangement imposed only an obligation to report the
incident to the respective Fisheries Associations. 8 3 As shown
earlier, in case of trawlers, in order to avoid collision due to fault
or negligence in observing international navigational rules, the
first arrangement required vessels to observe all the international
navigational rules without limitation, but the third arrangement
obligated them to abide by only some of the rules recognized by
their own governments. As a result, it is assumed that if the
collision happened due to a violation of the international rules
recognized by the Government of the violating vessel, the vessel
would be liable for any damage arising therefrom in accordance
with the rules. 84 But the solution of any matters of collision
according to the normal procedures of litigations, if the rules
recognized by China and Japan were different from each other,
would be much more problematical. Likewise, if the collisions
occurred without relation to the international navigation rules,
the non-governmental arrangements provided no guidelines for
assessment of damages.
In regard to trawlers' violation of conservation measures
concerning young fish, a "quasi-port state jurisdiction" was
conferred to implement such regulation. 85 This was not complete
exclusive port state jurisdiction, but it did seem that such a
provision might be most effective in implementing the enforcement measures under the non-governmental arrangements. The
effectiveness of this jurisdiction arose from the fact that the
Fisheries Association of the state in which the port was located
had been authorized to send special personnel to discover any
possible violation, in the event the suspected vessels entered the
port. Even if any infraction was found in the port, however, the
Association had no authority to prosecute or punish it. Instead,
the Association had to report it to the other Association, to which
the violating vessels belonged.
The non-governmental arrangements provided for negotiations as a final stage of dispute settlement. In case of failure of
negotiations, the settlement of the dispute was entirely in the
hands of the Fisheries Association of the flag state. All the other
83. Art. 6(3), id. and Art. 7(2} of the third arrangement.
84. For the rule of dividing damages, see Arts. 1-5 of the International
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Collisions between
Vessels, signed at Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910.
85. Clauses (1}-(4) of the appendix 2 of the third arrangement.
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party could expect in that regard was that the Fisheries
Association of the flag state would take action in good faith.

Seining Operations. The seine fishing arrangement did
not have provisions for enforcement measures in case of
violations of conservation measures and collision problems due to
non-observance of international navigation rules. It was assumed,
however, that violations of conservation measures would be
disciplined in conformity with provisions for trawlers since the
seining arrangement was a supplement to the third trawling
arrangement. Moreover, it seems unquestionable that the collision
problems due to violation of international rules would be solved in
accordance with international practices since seiners were
required to observe all the international navigational rules.
In general, the seining arrangement provided stronger
enforcement measures than those envisaged by any other
arrangements and even by the later governmental agreement.
Both Fisheries Associations were obliged to take measures for
supervising their seiners. The primary responsibility for enforcing
regulations, therefore, was placed on the two Associations.
Inspection agencies were ordinary seiners and four inspection
ships appointed by the two Associations (each Association
appointed two ships). Each Inspection Ship was required to be
conspicuously marked as "Inspection Ship" on the outer walls of
the vessel and had to carry three inspectors with certificates
approved by each Association. The two Associations had to notify
each other in advance of the types, horsepower, etc. of the
Inspection Ships and the lists of inspectors. 86 As a result, the
function of and responsibility for enforcing rules seemed to be
mutually divided very well between the two parties.
At this moment, in order to have a better understanding of the
enforcement tools, the present arrangement is briefly compared to
the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention. 87 Both were the first
86. Compare infra, text accompanying notes 164-75.
87. Articles 28-34 of the 1882 Convention elaborated the general principle of
mutual enforcement. The Convention was signed at Hague, May 6, 1882, and
entered into force May 14, 1884. The contracting parties were Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Effective in May,
1964, Great Britain withdrew from the Convention for the reason of establishing a
larger exclusive fishery zone than the three·mile limit accepted in the 1882
Convention. A new conference met in 1963 and 1964 in London and it adopted the
European Fisheries Convention of 1964, which was primarily concerned with
exclusive fishery zones. For the text of the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882,
see I U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High
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agreements for a mutual enforcement system in the respective
regions- in the East Asian Seas and the North Sea. In the event
infractions by foreign vessels were found in the East Asian Seas,
the Inspection Ships were entitled only to demand a written
statement from the vessel concerned and then were to report the
incident to their own Fisheries Association. The Association
receiving the report had to notify the other Fisheries Association
of the offence. In contrast, in the event of an infraction of the
North Sea regulations, the patrol vessels of any signatory nations
were empowered not only to authenticate all infractions of the
regulations but also to seize the offending vessels of other
nationalities, if serious infractions occurred. 88 The Japanese or
Chinese inspector was not allowed to go on board a fishing vessel
of the other side for any purpose. As a result, even if the inspector
had reasonable cause to believe that a violation had occurred, he
was not competent to inquire into the suspected violation. In
contrast, commanders of the North Sea cruisers, under the same
circumstances, might require the master of the vessel to exhibit
the official document establishing her nationality. Commanders
could board and search the vessel if necessary to obtain proof of
an offence. Furthermore, in similar cases under most other
fisheries conventions, inspectors have the power to investigate the
conduct of fishing vessels prior to the discovery of an infraction.
In regard to sanctions, both the present arrangement and the
North Sea Convention left the prosecution and punishment of
offenses in the hands of the flag state. 89 According to the present
arrangement, no physical imprisonment was imposed on the
persons in charge of the vessels. The punishments were only
warnings, a fine or disqualification of the vessel's operator. In
contrast, under the North Sea Convention, either fine or
imprisonment, or both, had to be imposed in accordance with the
domestic laws of each contracting state.9o
The North Sea Convention of 1882 was a multinational
convention reached under circumstances 91 showing the perceptiSeas 179, ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (1951). For the text of the European Fisheries
Convention of 1964, see 3 Int'l L. M. 476 (1964).
88. See Arts. 28, 29, and 30 of the third arrangement.
89. Clause six(2) of the seine fishing arrangement; Arts. 34-35 of the North
Sea Fisheries Convention.
90. Id. For local punitive measures of each contracting party, see U.N.
Legislative Series, supra note 87 at 185-95.
91. For the fisheries circumstances of the North Sea toward the close of the
century, see Stevenson, "International Regulations of the Fisheries on the High
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ble decline of certain fish and inadequate fisheries regulation in
the region. Yet it was intended only to keep order and to protect
fishermen and their applicances, and not as a conservation
measure. It seemed natural, therefore, that the North Sea
Convention was more restrictive than the non-governmental
arrangement.

D. Emergency Rescue
Generally, the scope of the emergency rescue and mooring
provisions of the Sino-Japanese arrangements included (1) marine
disaster; (2) other irresistible calamities; (3) a serious injury to, or
critical illness of, the crew on board the fishing vessels; and (4) the
need for emergency shelter or assistance. 92
In the first arrangement, there was no limit on the maximum
number of Japanese fishing vessels to be allowed simultaneous
emergency moorings at the designated ports of China. Such a
limit appeared in the second and third arrangements, i.e., fixing
the maximum number of vessels to fifty overall and to thirty at
each port. However, there were no restrictions on the number of
Chinese fishing vessels permitted emergency mooring under the
listed circumstances in any Japanese ports. Such different
treatments by Japan and China, however, were understandable
since Chinese fishermen seldom fished near the Japanese coastal
areas.
In order to get permission for mooring at the Chinese ports,
the Japanese fishing vessels ordinarily had to file an application
in advance and they were allowed to cast anchor only after
approval. But fishing vessels of either party were permitted to
enter directly the nearest port of the other party without prior
applications, in the following three emergencies: serious damage
to a vessel; a complete loss of engine power; and no other vessels
to tow her to a designated port. 93 Thus a fishing vessel which was
in immediate and imminent danger of marine disaster but had not
yet sustained any physical damage could not escape the
immediate calamity by entering directly the nearest port.
In most marine disasters requiring emergency shelters, it
would be extremely difficult to draw a line between the four
circumstances, 94 allowing emergency moorings at the designated
tleas," 28 _Bull. U.S. Bureau of Fisheries 116, 118 (1908), cited in J. Tomasevich,
International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources 269 (1943).
92. See infra, text accompanying notes 120-21.
93. See Clause III of the appendix 4 of the third arrangement.
94. The four emergencies are as follows:
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ports only and the three situations allowing direct entry into any
nearest port. If the "direct entry" provision (clause III) were
narrowly interpreted so as to cover only the three categories, thus
excluding such situations as necessary for any precautionary
protective measures, it would be in conflict with the purpose of
Article 5 (1) of the same arrangement which requires the Fisheries
Associations to provide to fishing vessels in distress every
assistance necessary for rescue and emergency mooring prior to
suffering physical damage. Clause IX of the same appendix
required vessels to observe strictly different rules with respect to
direct entry and the other types of entry. The vessels which
entered any port not in conformity with the rules were to be tried
by the local laws of the coastal state and such vessels had to bear
all the consequences arising therefrom. To the same extent,
therefore, clause IX would be inconsistent with the spirit of Art. 5
(1), if clause IX were restrictively applied to each case.
The mooring time was limited to the duration of typhoon or
the duration of repairs. In the event the local repair facilities were
not satisfactory, the vessels under repair should be towed to their
own country with the help of their own Fisheries Association
within 10 days under the first arrangement. The third arrangement, however, removed the 10-day-limit provision.95 When a
fishing vessel entered or left the designated mooring port and
during the mooring period, it had to observe certain rules
stipulated by the local laws and this arrangement. Fishing vessels
rescued had to pay the telegraphic charges and other expenses in
accordance with the relevant provisions of this arrangement.
IV. COMPARISON OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT

The governmental agreement is similar to the nongovemm.ental arrangement, but its contents are simpler. It
(1) When the safety of the vessel is obviously in danger because its hull is
seriously damaged or its engine is in serious trouble;
(2) When a typhoon or inclement weather is encountered, and there is really
no other way to ward off danger except by emergency mooring;
(3) When a crew member is seriously wounded or critically ill (not including
infectious diseases) and urgently needs medical care;
(4) When it is necessary to escort the rescued crew members or vessels in
distress to a port of the other side.
For details, see Clause (1) of appendix 4 of the third arrangement.
95. Cf. Clause 5 of appendix 3 of the first arrangement and Clause 5 of
appendix 4 of the third arrangement.
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consists of a main text (consisting of eight articles), two
appendices, three exchanges of notes, an agreed minute, and two
exchanges of letters. Significantly, the governmental agreement
voices a more conspicuous concern about conservation than does
the non-governmental agreement. The accord lays down stricter
rules for ensuring preservation and effective utilization of
fisheries resources. Interestingly enough, the safety regulation of
fishing operations, which was one of the main characteristics of
the non-governmental arrangements, is not stipulated in the
present agreement. It is to be made non-governmentally by the
civilian fishing circles of the two parties. Enforcement measures
are based on a typical national jurisdiction of flag state. Since
states have become enforcing agencies, such an inefficiency as
may arise from national jurisdiction might be partially supplemented. The government accord provides for emergency rescue
and shelter, and a joint fisheries commission is newly established.
The functions and obligations of this commission are discussed in
the following section, where they are compared with those
contained in the agreements in the North Pacific Ocean.
The comparison between the non-governmental and governmental agreements will largely deal with four fields: (1) fishing
zones, (2) enforcement measures, (3) the fisheries commission and
(4) miscellaneous problems. The 1965 non-governmental arrangement, which was the latest one, will serve as a basis for the
following comparison with the governmental agreement.

A. Fishing Zones
As was the case in the non-governmental arrangements, the
present agreement is applicable only to the agreed fishing zones
in the Yellow and East China Seas; its applicability is also
excluded from the territorial waters and coastal fisheries of each
Contracting State. The basic fishing line delimiting the agreed
fishing zones and the coastal fisheries areas has not been
changed. However, the agreed fishing zones, to which a GOOhorsepower limit is to be applied, have been substantially
expanded up to 100 to 150 miles east of the Chinese mainland
("horsepower regulation zone"). As a result, the most controversial
issue during the negotiation of the non-governmental arrangements, i.e., the allocation of fishing zones, is solved in the present
agreement in favor of the Chinese original intent not only from
the geographic point of view but also from the point of view of the
fishing regulation.
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In the horsepower regulation zone, trawlers with engine
capacities of 600 horsepower or more and seiners with 660
horsepower or more are respectively prohibited to operate
throughout the year (map 5). It may be noted that the horsepower
regulation zones are agreed-upon areas in line with the eventual
advent of a 200-mile economic zone, even though the distance is
shorter than 200 miles and the degree of exclusivity of coastal
jurisdiction in the zones is less rigid than that of the economic
zone concept under discussion at the current sessions of the Law
of the Sea Conference.96
Some sections of the horsepower regulation zone are designated by various names for specific fishing regulations. 97 In
relation to trawling operations, the agreement designates areas
closed for certain periods to fishing (two "fishery fallow zones")98
as well as three fishery protection zones in which restrictions are
placed on both the number of vessels and the fishing period. 99 The
total size of the areas covered by the two fishery fallow zones and
the three fishery protection zones is approximately the same as
that of the main six fishing zones under the non-governmental
arrangement. 100 In relation to seining operations, the horsepower
regulation zone is divided by the line of the 32nd degree northern
latitude into two seine fishery protection zones (map 5). 101
96. Cf. Art. 45(1) and (2) and Art. 50(2) and (3), particularly (4) of Part II of the
Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975).
97. Exceptionally, some parts of the first fishery fallow zone and the first
protection zone spread over beyond the limit of the horsepower regulation zone.
98. The fishery fallow zones are regulated both in terms of the fishing period
and the kind of fishing operation. For details, see Clause 1(2)(i)-(ii) of appendix 1
of the governmental agreement.
99. See Clause 1(3)(i)-(iii) of appendix 1 of Clause 1(1) of the agreed minute of
the governmental agreement.
100. The first fishery fallow zone is approximately half the total of the first and
second zones under the non-governmental arrangement. The zone spreads over an
area roughly three-fourths the total area of the non-governmental third and fourth
fishing zones. The first fishery protection zone is a new area the most part of
which thus does not overlap with any agreed fishing areas under either the nongovernmental or governmental agreement. The second fishery protection zone is
approximately half the area of combined fifth and sixth fishing zones under the
non-governmental arrangement. The third fishery protection zone is located in the
southern-most area.
101. In the first protection zone, all Japanese seiners are to abstain from
fishing throughout the year. In the second zone, during August through December,
the maximum number of seiners may not exceed 25 teams for the Japanese and 70
teams for the Chinese. For the first zone, see Clause 2(2) of appendix 1 of the
governmental agreement and the Japanese note regarding Clause 2(2) of the
appendix 1; for the second zone, see Clause 2(3) of the appendix 1 and Clause 1(2)
of the agreed minute, id.
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The Sino-Japanese Governmental Fisheries Agreement of 1975
(Map 5)
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The trawl fishing prohibited zone as well as the military zones
are still recognized by the present agreement. These two special
zones were established in conformity with Chinese domestic laws.
The military zones will be explained later. The present trawl
fishing prohibited zone is the same area as the previous one under
the non-governmental arrangement. 102 The dispute over the
legality of the zone has not, in legal sense, been resolved, as was
the case under the non-governmental arrangement. Here again;
Japan was not strong enough to reject the Chinese unilateral
claim. The controversy ended as a result of Japan's promising to
impose self-restraints on her fishermen. Thus, Chinese as well as
Japanese fishermen were banned from fishing in the zone.
Furthermore, trawlers have to observe other conservation
measures in terms of restrictions on the sizes of fish and mesh of
net, and on the amount of young fish. Seiners also must observe
the other conservation measures in terms of restrictions on the
numbers of lighting and netting ships 103 and on the luminicity of
light, in addition to the same restrictions on trawlers.
In short, the governmental conservation measures in regard
to trawlers are exactly the same as the non-governmental ones.
Likewise, the present conservation measures concerning seiners
are not much changed. The only changes are a new restriction on
the number of netting ships and more restrictions on the sizes of
fish and net. As regard the size of fishing zones, the seining zones
in fact are not much changed since the present 660 horsepower
limit is the same as the previous limit and the size of areas is
almost identical in both the governmental and non-governmental
agreements, except for a slight variation of marginal line of the
horsepower regulation zones toward the northeast. However, the
horsepower regulation zones relating to trawlers are largely
different in the governmental and non-governmental agreements
since the 600 horsepower limit and the zones connected with it are
newly established for the purpose of trawl fishing regulations.

102. This zone is east of the basic fishing line drawn from the northern-most
point at 37 degrees 3 minutes down to the southern-most point at 27 degrees and
121 degrees 10 minutes east longitude.
103. The provision about the netting ship is new. The non-governmental
arrangement did not limit the number of netting ships. Thus, more young fish will
be protected as much as such restrictions are increased. Cf. Clause 2(5) of appendix
1 of the governmental agreement and Clause 2 and 3 of the non-governmental
seine arrangement.
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B. Enforcement M:essures
By enforcement is meant the procedure through which the
obedience of fishing vessels to the governmental and nongovernmental agreements is to be secured. The present enforcement of both trawling and seining operations is considered in one
provision (Art. 3). The assessment of the present enforcement
measures is largely based on the regulations applicable to fishing
zones, 104 and relates to the following issues: (1) conservation
methods (2) safety of fishing operations (3) methods of inspection
and (4) sanctions. The first two are concerned with the scope of
enforcement measures and in consequence they set the criteria for
determining violations, and the latter two are related to the legal
form and effect of the present enforcement measures.

1. Scope of Enforcement
As has already been shown, the conservation measures
accepted by the present agreement have not changed from those
contained in the non-governmental arrangements. Thus, in the
event of violation of the number of vessels in the agreed fishing
zones or of the limit of the fishing zones, each Contracting State
as an enforcing agency is now obliged to find such violation and
to report to the other State. But in regard to infringement of
restriction on the amount of young fish caught, the "quasi-port
jurisdiction" contained in the non-governmental arrangement is
not provided in the governmental agreement. The safety regulations, navigational rules and the regulation concerning the
settlement of marine incidents are to be agreed on a nongovernmental basis in the future. 105 At this point, therefore, the
non-governmental enforcement measures for collision or damage
disputes can not be comparatively discussed.
The scope of the governmental measures has become more
restrictive than that of the non-governmental ones, in view of the
104. Art. 1 and Clause 3 of the agreed minute of the governmental agreement.
These provision raise a question how violations of fishing vessels in the coastal
fishing zone will be controlled. For example, as to "hot pursuit" see infra note 143.
105. See Art. 4 of the main text and Clause of the agreed minute of the
governmental agreement. The matters are now left to the civilian fishing
industries of the two states for further negotiations. The subjects to be agreed are
as follows: (1) marks and signals; (2) rules to be observed in operation; (3)
provisions for making way for each other; (4) provisions for mooring; (5) customary
rules for safe fishing operations; and (6) provisions dealing with marine incidents.
Also, compare with the relevant provisions of the Korea·Japan Fisheries
Convention at supra note 1.
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increase in the size of the regulated fishing zones and of the
decrease in the amount of catchable young fish. Also, the subject
of enforcement has shifted from the Fisheries Associations under
the non-governmental arrangements to the States under the
present agreement. Thus the responsibilities for the enforcement
of such conservation methods are entrusted primarily to each
Contracting State. This shift of the power of enforcement from one
body to another seems to increase the function of enforcement
since means and powers exercised by a State are generally
regarded more inclusive and broader than those exercised by a
civilian fishing association. 106 But the effectiveness of the present
methods of conservation remains to be compared with other types
of conservation measures such as quotas, gear restrictions, entry
limit, etc. 1 0 7

2. Legal Form and Effect of Enforcement
The effectiveness of conservation measures is closely related
to the mutual cooperation of fishermen and the legal system of
enforcement. The present agreement does not provide any details
concerning the duties of enforcements, but lays down in general
terms that each state is obliged in the first place to supervise and
instruct all fishing vessels under its own jurisidction in order to
ensure the implementation of the agreement and to avoid any
violations of the agreement. In addition, each state is obliged to
take action against any violations by its own fishing vessels.1° 8
Moreover, all fishing vessels, both trawlers and seiners, operating
in the agreed fishing zones have to cooperate with each other in
order that they may secure the enforcing of this agreement. 109 In
this regard, it seems appropriate to assume that such an
obligation of vessels to cooperate would be limited to that of
notification of violations by foreign vessels through the channel
of their own government to the other state to which violating
vessels belong, since the notification obligation is to be dealt with
on the governmental level under the present agreement. As a
result, the current notification obligation of trawlers is identical to
that under the non-governmental arrangement. On the other
106. Cf. Art. 3(1), id. with Art. 9 of the third non-governmental arrangement
and Clause 6(1) of the non-governmental seine arrangement.
107. See D. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries 59-68 (1965). And
compare with the conservation measures under the Northwest Pacific Fisheries
Convention, infra at 64-72.
•
108. Art. 3(1) of the governmental agreement.
109. Art. 3(3) of the governmental agreement.
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hand, seiners under the present accord have a mere notification
obligation but seiners under the non-governmental arrangement
had not only notifying but also supervising obligations in 1he
course of their operations.
In regard to the definition of enforcement agency, most other
fisheries conventions ordinarily provide that certain types of
vessels or certain kinds of authorized officers have to be
designated in order to find infringements. 110 Since the present
agreement is silent on the question, 111 the two contracting parties
are given some discretion in interpreting the term "state" as an
agency for finding or determining violations. In modern treaty
practice, the enforcement function does not necessarily belong to
the navy of the state.11 2 However, if Japan or China is somewhat
overenthusiastic in exercising enforcement, the possibility has not
been ruled out that the present agreement may include, as an
inspection agency, naval vessels, in addition to the state-run
vessels commanded by a specially appointed officer, aircraft and
civilian ships.
110. See Art. Il(l) of the Convention of the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery
of the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, 222 U.N.T.S. 77 (1955),
to which the parties are Canada and the United States; Art. Vl(1) of the Interim
Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, February 9, 1957, 314
U.N.T.S. 105 (1958). The parties are Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R. and the United
States; Art. IX of the Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of
the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River System, May 26, 1930, 1 U.N.
Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas 195-98
(1951). The parties are Canada and the United States; Art. X of the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952,
205 U.N.T.S. 65 (1955). The parties are Canada, Japan and the United States; Art.
VII (1) of the Treaty Concerning Fisheries on the High Seas in the Northwest
Pacific Ocean, May 14, 1956, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 763 (1959). The parties are Japan
and U.S.S.R. Even the United States seems to have trouble in policing effectively
its 12-mile fisheries zones. For details on it and other policing problems, see
Commission of Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, Panel Report, Marine
Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for their Development, H.R. Doc. N.
91-2, part 3, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. at VIII 55 (1969); Carroz and Roche "The
International Policing of High Seas Fisheries," [1968] Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 62 (1968).
111. As far as trawl fishing is concerned, compared with the non-governmental
arrangement, the present agreement has developed a step forward since it provides
at least some procedures for finding any violations of regulations. Under the nongovernmental trawl fishing arrangement, there were neither supervising authorities nor any other enforcement agencies. For further discussion, see supra, text
accompanying note 81.
112. See Koers, "The Enforcement of International Fisheries Agreements," 1
Neth. Y.B. Int'l L. 8 (1970); A. Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries:
A Study of Regional Fisheries Organizations (1973).
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With respect to the powers of the enforcement agency, a
general requirement is that authorized officers must carry
documents of identity and that their vessels must show a special
flag or pennant. Under the present agreement, however, it is not
clear whether each contracting state as an inspection agency
should be obliged to observe such limitations. The previous nongovernmental seine fishing arrangement had a provision requiring inspection ships and inspectors to comply with the above
conditions. As far as seining operations are concerned, therefore,
it seems that the present provision in regard to the powers of the
inspection agency is a backward step compared with the previous
one. A critical question with respect to the authority of the
inspectors is whether inspectors under the present agreement
have power to visit and search any ship suspected of violations
before they are established as infractions. In this connection, it is
not easy to answer whether a "reasonable cause" would be
sufficient for the inspectors under the present agreement to act on
suspected infringements. Even after an infraction is established,
it is still problematic to decide how far the enforcement agency
under the present agreement can exercise its authority in order to
obtain evidence and to deter further infractions on the spot. In
other words, the question in these circumstances is whether the
inspectors have authority to arrest or seize such persons or
vessels. It is also imaginable that a state may often encounter
some dissatisfaction in relation to the punitive measures taken by
the othei atate if the latter, while exercising the jurisdiction of the
flag state over its own vessels, acts on prosecution and punishment in an arbitrary fashion.
With respect to all of those questions, the pertinent paragraph
2 of Article 3 of the agreement simply stipulates as follows:
Either of the contracting states is entitled to notify the other
contracting state of the facts and circumstances of the
violations by foreign fishing vessels of the provisions of
appendix I of this agreement. The contracting state thus
notified shall promptly inform the other aggrieved state of
the results of the action it has taken. 113
From this paragraph, some implications may be drawn to
give at least some general answers to the above questions. First,
the agreement stresses the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state
with respect to prosecution and punishment of infractions. If
113. Art. 3(2) of the governmental agreement.
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inspection agencies such as naval vessels or government-owned
vessels have a reasonable cause to believe that fishing vessels of
the other state have violated a provision of the agreement, they
might exercise their enforcement authority to the extent allegedly
"necessary or appropriate" for obtaining evidence or witnesses. In
this connection, if there is a dispute between the two parties about
the proper exercise of enforcement authority, the agreement does
not provide for guidelines for the solution. Instead, the agreement,
in a considerable measure, indicates that the state as an
inspection agency may have discretion in choosing and exercising
the instruments of inspection, since the inspection power is
conferred on the state without specifying the scope of the
discretion. And in the special circumstances where the two
contracting states want to exercise concurrently the enforcement
authority relating to finding infractions, the agreement indicates
the primacy of the flag state jurisdiction; the latter would prevail
over in light of the responsibility of the flag state for supervising
and instructing its vessels in order to have them observe
regulations. 114
Even though flag state jurisdiction is established with respect
to prosecution and punishment, the agreement is still silent on the
sanctions against any infractions. The non-governmental arrangements provided at least for three different sanctions, i.e.,
warning, punishment (in case of trawlers) and warning, fine, or
disqualification (in case of seiners), depending on the merits of
each case. In view of primary responsibility of each contracting
state for exercising surveillance over its own fishermen, a
question is raised as to whether sanctions should be imposed on
fishermen or state if a state fails to implement such an obligation.
The present agreement does not establish a legal channel for
settling disputes arising from enforcement measures. The previous
arrangement provided at least negotiations as a final method of
dispute settlement, but the governmental agreement does not
mention any method at all. Therefore, the current method of
dispute settlement is exclusively in the hands of the contracting
flag state as it was in the previous arrangement.
The agreed fishing zones under the present agreement are
larger than those under the non-governmental arrangements. If
the methods of enforcements are restrictively defined so as to
comprise only a certain kind of inspection vessels or a certain
kind of inspectors holding certain commissions, the policing of the
114. Id., Art. 1.
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presently enlarged fishing zones is likely to be much less effective
in proportion to the increased fishing areas and the restricted
methods of enforcement. Under the present agreement, however,
China may exercise an unrestricted discretional power in selecting
and exhausting its available instruments and means for an
inspection purpose. This is one of the ambiguous provisions that
China might utilize for its expedience. On the other hand, the
methods of enforcement, without naming the kinds of punishments, may enable Japan, while exercising the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over its vessels, to exercise a discretionary
power in assessing or imposing the penalties for the infringements by its own vessels.
Insofar as state power tends to be abused, the success of the
present enforcement system depends largely on the political
relations between the two states, since on the one hand, the
authority of determining of any infringements is entrusted to the
policing state and, on the other, the authority for imposing any
penalties for violations is given to the flag state, without any
limitations on such authority. If diplomatic relations between the
states should deteriorate for whatever reasons, then the enforcing
power of the state in accordance with the present agreement could
be enlarged without being checked by means of treaty provisions;
on the other hand, a certain degree of checking power is exerted
by the binding authority of the treaty provisions under normal
treaty relations.

C. Fisheries Commission
Since the fisheries agreement has been transformed from a
non-governmental to a governmental accord, in theory all the
problems derived from the governmental agreement should be
dealt with by the government. The establishment of a fisheries
commission, however, provides an intermediate instrument for
resolving fishery problems. A comparison of the nongovernmental and governmental agreements about the problems
of the fisheries commissions cannot be made at this stage since
the non-governmental arrangements had no fisheries commission.
In this section, only the most important functions of the
Commission are introduced.
First, the Commission is to review the implementation of the
agreement and, if necessary, to recommend to both contracting
states the revision of the appendices of the agreement. The legal
capacities of the Commission are to be limited to the recommenda-

44

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIEs SERIES

tions for the revision of the conservation measures since the
appendices deal only with matters relating to conservation
measures. All the resolutions, recommendations and other
decisions of the Commission are to be made only by the mutual
agreement of the commissioners attending the meeting. The
requirement for "mutual agreement or concurrence" for those
purposes is commonly provided in most of the fisheries conventions.115 The Commission is not vested with an extensive power to
enter into agreement as an independent entity, which often may
be seen in other international fisheries conventions. 116 The
recommendations are to be binding on member states if they are
accepted by the contracting states through an exchange of
notes. 117 In short, the Commission has no decision-making
function.
Another function of the Commission is to exchange data
concerning fisheries and to review the conditions of fishery
resources in the agreed fishing zones.U 8 The Fisheries Associations of both parties under the non-governmental arrangements
were not obliged but willing to exchange data concerning fishery
investigations and research, etc. When it is deemed necessary, the
Commission is to review the conservation measures with respect
to fishery resources and any problems related to conservation.
Similarly, the Fisheries Associations under the non-governmental
arrangements were to enforce the conservation measures. In this
regard, the previous Fisheries Associations appeared more like an
enforcing agency, while the present Commission appears to be
more like a reviewing agency. 119

D. Other Problems
As shown above, the present agreement does not yet contain
provisions concerning the regulation of safety operations, and the
provisions about the marine research data under the nongovernmental arrangements are shortened into a provision
concerning the functions of the Fisheries Commission. Thus the
remaining problems of the present agreement which need to be
compared relate to emergency rescue and mooring.
115. Id., Art. 6(3).
116. See, for example, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (1950); the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (1963).
117. Art. 7(2) of the governmental agreement.
118. Id., Art. 6(4)(iii).
119. For further discussions on the Commission, see infra, text accompanying
notes 176-86.
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The present agreement lays down two situations in which
each state ought to provide assistance and protection to fishing
vessels in distress: marine disaster and irresistible calamities. 120
The previous non-governmental arrangement stipulated four
specific marine emergencies. In the case of emergency, the present
agreement further obliges each coastal state to inform authorities
of the accident. The agreement does not, however, specify what
kinds of marine disasters ought to be considered as justifying an
emergency shelter. Instead it explicitly mentions only bad
weather and irresistible calamities as situations where sheltering
is required. 121
In circumstances where it would be impossible for a fishing
vessel in distress to reach its designated port, the present
agreement does not state what kind of emergencies would justify a
direct entry into the nearest port of the coastal state. Rather, it
defmes the situation as an event in which the vessels in distress
"cannot enter any designated ports." The non-governmental
arrangement enumerated in a restrictive manner three situations
for direct entries.12z
In any emergency, the only requirement under the present
agreement for entering the designated ports is the notification of
such an emergency situation. 123 Vessels are, of course, required to
act in good faith in making such reports. But in more serious
circumstances, where the fishing vessels cannot enter the
designated ports, they have to explain the reasons by means of
notice to the authorities concerned prior to making direct entry
into any nearest port. Thus, under the present agreement, a
situation meeting the characteristics of marine disaster or
irresistible calamities would allow entry into designated port with
requirement of notification, while a situation in which a vessel in
distress "cannot enter any designated ports" would allow direct
entry into any nearest port with requirement of explaining the
reasons. Once fishing vessels have entered the ports of the coastal
120. Art. 5(1) of the governmental agreement.
121. Id., Art. 5(2). It is not explicit as to what are bad weather and irresistible
calamities.
122. Id., Clause 1(3) of the appendix II, and see supra, text accompanying note
94.
123. The contents of a notice must include the following: the name of vessel, a
call sign, present location, a port registration, a net tonnage, name of captain,
number of crew, destination of sheltering port, the expected time of arrival, and the
reasons for shelter. See Clause 3 of the appendix II of the governmental agreement.
For the other methods of contacting the harbor authorities, see id., Clause 2 and 4
of the appendix II; and for the designated ports, see id., Clause 1.
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states, they must abide by the pertinent provisions of the
agreement, the local regulations and instructions. In this
connection, two hypothetical questions arise. First, for example, in
the event of a serious injury to, or critical illness of, the crew, it is
uncertain whether the authorities of the coastal state could refuse
request for entry into designated port on the ground that the
situation does not fall under the two categories such as marine
disaster or irresistible calamities. Second, it is also uncertain
whether the local judicial authority could punish any vessels of
the other party which had directly entered the nearest ports
complying with the requirement for explaining the reasons for
allegedly more serious circumstances where the vessels cannot
enter the designated ports. In regard to the latter question, the
provisions of the non-governmental and governmental agreements may be compared. The three categorical emergencies
provided in the non-governmental arrangement might set the
criteria for assessing the severity of emergencies and for
sanctioning any violations thereof. 124 On the other hand, they
might cause some inflexibility in interpreting the spirit of the
emergency rescue provisions since they required the existence of a
certain damage or damages prior to making any direct entry into
the nearest port.
The present agreement, without naming categorical emergencies, seems more flexible in allowing direct entry since the
situation where vessels cannot enter designated ports may be
interpreted more flexibly than the enumerated situation. From
that point of view, the provisions of the present agreement seem to
serve better the purport of rescuing and protecting human lives
and properties from the marine disaster than those of the previous
arrangement, as far as direct entry is concerned.
V. COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH OTHER
NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES CONVENTIONS

The North Pacific fisheries conventions chosen to be compared with the governmental agreement are the 1965 Korea-Japan
Fisheries Convention, the Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific
Fisheries Convention, and the International Fisheries Convention
on the North Pacific Ocean. The comparison focuses on the main
124. Under the non-governmental arrangement, some sanctional measures
might be imposed on fishing vessels, if the vessels entered designated or nondesignated ports not in conformity with the each allowable emergency. For details,
see supra, text accompanying notes 92-94.
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legal issues contained in each convention, namely, (1) fishing
zones, (2) enforcement measures and (3) fisheries commissions.

The Korea-Japan Fisheries Convention 125 (the KoreaJapan Convention). This convention is the result of 14 years of
hard negotiations between the two states since the Korean
Proclamation of Peace (Rhee) Line in 1952 until the conclusion of
the Convention in 1965. 126 The mandatory life of the Agreement
was 5 years, which elapsed in December, 1970; and it is now
terminable one year after the date of giving notice.
The remarkable features of the Convention are, among others,
that: a most stanch supporter of the three-mile limit virtually for
all purposes, Japan recognized for the first time an exclusive 12mile fisheries zone off the coast of a foreign country (Korea}; 127
both parties agreed to the establishment of a third party
arbitration for the settlement of disputes; 128 and they set up the
joint fishery resources survey zone without deciding upon the
subjects and contents of the survey (map 6).

The Soviet-Japanese Northwest Pacific Fisheries
Convention (the Soviet-Japanese Convention).l 29 Since World
War II, the Soviet Union and Japan have not been able to agree
on a peace treaty; 130 thus, in legal sense, a state of war had existed
125. For the text, see 4 Int'l Legal Mats 1128 (1965).
126. For discussions of the Japan·Korea Fishery Agreement, see Takabayashi,
"Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea: Agreement
on Fisheries," 10 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 16-22 (1966); G. Weissberg, supra note 22; Oda,
"Japan and International Conventions Relating to North Pacific Fisheries," 43
Wash. L. Rev. 63, 70-73 (1967); Park, supra note 13 at 102-110.
127. Prior to this convention, Japan accepted the prohibition of drift net fishing
operations within 40 miles off the coasts of either party, in accordance with the
Japan-U.S.S.R. Fishery Convention of 1956. This, therefore, should be noted as a
precedent for the extension of coastal jurisdiction accepted by Japan. For details,
see infra, text accompanying note 152-53. And for another type of fishery zones
recognized by a multinational fisheries convention, see Arts. 2 and 3 of the
European Convention on Fisheries, of 1964. For its text, see supra note 87.
128. This arbitration clause may be regarded as unique except for a similar
provision of the European Convention on Fisheries of 1964 (Arts. 13 and Annex II
1-15). The article of the Korea-Japan Convention seems to indicate that both
states had met earlier some complicated and hard fishery problems; and that they
intend to solve such problems in an agreed legal framework. Such a legalistic
method for the settlement of disputes seems significant at least to the East Asian
peoples who have traditionally preferred the diplomatic channel for solution of
conflicting interests. In this connexion, compare the provisions of the JapaneseChinese non-governmental arrangement at supra, text accompanying note 81.
129. For the text, see supra note 110.
130. See The New York Times, at 1 and 2, col. 3 (Jan. 14, 1976).
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until October 1956 when the two states signed a Joint Declaration
terminating the state of war. 131 Particularly in the early 1950's,
the safety of the Japanese fishing activities in the Northwest
Pacific Ocean was not guaranteed because of the state of war. For
protection of the Japanese fishing industry in that region, as an
initiative of Japan, the fishery negotiations between the two
states started in 1955 at London, and finally the agreement was
reached on March 14, 1956. 132 The mandatory life of this
Convention was 10 years, which expired in March 1966; it is now
terminable through a one-year termination notice.

The International Fisheries Convention on the North
Pacific Ocean (the Tripartite convention between Canada,
Japan, and the United States).l 33 This convention was the first
fruit of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty imposing on Japan
an obligation to negotiate with the Allied Powers about the
fisheries problems. 134 Since the convention was signed prior to the
signing of the Peace Treaty, there have been some arguments
about the sovereign equality of Japan in the process of concluding
it. 135 The treaty had a mandatory life of 10 years, which elapsed in
June 19n8; it is now terminable on one year written notice. 136
l:H. For the text, see 263 U.N. T.S. 112 (1957).

132. For the historical development and legal analysis of the Agreement, see
Ohira, supra note 69, at 1-18, Kawakami, "Outline of the Japanese-Soviet Fishery
Talks (1962)," 7 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 24-29 (1963); S. Oda, International Control of
Sea Resources 28-31, 72-76 (1963); Oda, supra note 126, at 67-70; for a policy
consideration in relation to Canada and the United States, see Ginsburgs and
Shrewsbury, "The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Problem in the North-West Pacific,
1945-56," 1 Int'l Studies 259, 271-72 (1964).
133. For the text, supra note 125.
134. See supra, text accompanying notes 32-34.
135. Although the Allied Commander issued a memorandum to the Japanese
government for the purposes of negotiating, signing and ratifying the Convention,
the Japanese delegation was given the status of a sovereign delegation. For the
,Japanese arguments, see Oda, supra note 126, at 64; and for the excellent
discussion of the positions of Canada and the United States, see Johnson, "The
Japan-United States Salmon Conflict," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 1-43 (1967).
136. Since the Tripartite convention was made, nine bilateral fisheries·related
agreements have been made between Japan and the United States. Most of them
have directly or indirectly modified the Tripartite convention in relation to Japan
and the United States. Two of them directly related to this convention are: An
Exchange of Notes May 9, 1967 whereby Japan agreed to curtail certain fisheries
within the 12-mile U.S. fisheries zones, and to limit some fisheries altogether, 6
Int'l Legal Mats 745 (1967); Agreement between the United States and Japan
Concerning Salmon Fishing, Dec. 24, 1974, U.S.L.C. Congressional Research
Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements on Fisheries 795 (1974). For
further information, see Windley, "International Practice Regarding Traditional

50

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

The convention has two distinctive features: (1) the initiation
of the "abstention principle," whereby Japan, and to a lesser
extent Canada, agreed to abstain from fishing stocks of certain
speCies of salmon in certain areas; 137 and (2) the arbitration clause
providing for a "special committee" consisting of scientists from
neutral countries. 13B

A. Fishing Zones
A common feature of the Sino-Japanese governmental
agreement and all the other fisheries conventions mentioned, is
that they do not apply to the territorial waters of the contracting
states. 13 9 Another common distinction among them, except for the
Soviet-Japanese Convention, is that they do not apply to the
coastal fisheries. 140 A third distinction is that while the fishing
Fishing Privileges of Foreign Fishermen 'in Zones of Extended Maritime
Jurisdiction," 63 Am. J. lnt'l L. 490, 493-4 (1969); W. Parker, Alaska and the Law
of the Sea: International Fisheries Regimes of the Northpacific 28-46 (1974).
137. For comments on international fisheries problems in the North Pacific
Ocean, see K. Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries with Special Reference to Alaska
Salmon 286-302 (1939); J. Tomasevich, supra note 91, at 29-36; Kuhn, "The
Proposed International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean," 46 Am. J. lnt'l L. 323-30 (1952); Note, "A Map Analysis of Japan's
Fishery Problems," 3 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 103, 105-6 (1959); Comment, "North Pacific
Fisheries Treaties and International Law of the Seas," 38 Wash L. Rev. 223-48
(1963); Nakamura, "The Japan-United States Negotiations concerning King Crab
Fishery in the Eastern Bering Sea," 9 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 36-45 (1965); particularly
for the Japanese practice in international law on the principle of abstention, see id.
at 121-6; Herrington, "International Issues of Pacific Fisheries," 55 Dep't of State
Bull. No. 1420, 500-4 (1966); Johnson supra note 135, at 1-43; Oda, supra note 126
at 63-75; Johnston, "New Uses of International Law in the North Pacific," 43
Wash. L. Rev. 77-113 (1967); Nagasaki, "Some Japanese Far-Sea Fisheries," 43
Wash. L. Rev. 199-229 (1967); Swygard, "Politics of the North Pacific Fisheries
with Special Reference to the Twelve-Mile Bill," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 269-82 (1967);
Crutchfield, "Management of the North Pacific Fisheries," id. at 283-307; Jacobs,
"United States Participation in International Fisheries Agreements," 6 J. Mar. L.
Comm. 4 71-529 (1975).
138. The idea of establishing an arbitration by specialists on the particular
subject matters seems to be well reflected in the current Conference on the Law of
the Sea. See Special Procedures on the settlement of fishery disputes, Annes IIA of
Pt. IV of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9
(1975).
139. Art. 1(1) and Clause 3 of the agreed minute, the governmental agreement;
Art. 1(1), Korea-Japan Convention; Art. 1(1), Soviet-Japanese Convention; and Art.
1(1) and (2), the Tripartite Convention.
140. Id. The Soviet-Japanese Convention prohibits fishing operations by drift
net in the waters within 40 miles off the coasts of the territories of either party. It
may thus be said that the Convention also does not apply to coastal fisheries in
narrow sense.
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zones under both the Sino-Japanese and the Korea-Japan
conventions are defined in detail in terms of longitude and
latitude, those under the Sovient-.Japanese and Tripartite conventions are designated by several lines and the names of the areas.

1. Korea-Japan Convention
The Korea-Japan Convention involves more legal issues with
respect to defining the fishing zones than the Sino-Japanese
agreement and the other conventions. Since the Convention
recognizes a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone of either party, one
area in the Korean Strait overlaps between Tsushima Island
(Japan) and the southern part of Korea. The longest and shortest
distances of the Korean Strait between the Japanese Island and
the Korean coast are 26.2 and 23.2 miles, respectively. The fishing
zone was divided into two parts by compromise, and thus the
method of delimiting the zone deviates from the median-line
principle stipulated by Article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. With regard to the baseline,
the Korea-Japan Convention has a peculiar provision stipulating
that the straight baReline shall be determined through "consultation" with the other party. The Korean Peninsula is surrounded
by the sea in the east, south and west. The east coast has no
indentations or islands which could cause problems in relation to
drawing straight baselines or closing lines. 141 But the south and
west coasts have many highly irregular indentations as well as
over 3,000 islands. The geography itself would justify the drawing
of reasonable straight baselines. The four straight baselines
drawn by Korea did not incur any objections from Japan or other
countries. Thus it does not appear that the southern and western
coasts of Korea need consultation with the other interested
countries for the purpose of drawing straight lines in accordance
with international standards. 142
The Korea-Japan Convention provides for a joint fishery
regulation zone which excludes in fact the Japanese 3-mile
territorial sea and the Korean 12-mile exclusive fishery zone. 14 3
141. Japan did not ohject to the closing lines at the mouths of the two bays
along the Korean east coast (the Yungil Bay and Ulsan Bay).
142. Compare with the Chinese straight baseline, at supra text accompanying
note 41.
143. The Korean Government has never enunciated the policy on the breadth of
the territorial watPrs. Customarily, Korea has observed the 3-mile limit. As a
result, Korea became involved in a question as to whether the right of "hot
pursuit" could be exercised from the fishery zone. In March, 1966, the Kaiyomaru
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The joint regulation zone is the main convention area comparable
to the fishing zones under the Sino-Japanese agreement for the
purpose of conservation measures. 144 In addition, joint resources
survey zones were established outside of the joint control zone by
the 1967 exchange of letters at the recommendation of the KoreaJapan Joint Fisheries Commission at its first session of 1966. The
conservation measures in the joint regulation zone are principally
of a provisional character since they will cease to apply whenever
the scientific surveys show that the measures do not provide for
the maximum sustainable productivity of fishery resources. 14 5 As
No. 53, a Japanese fishing vessel, was caught by a Korean patrol boat for allegedly
violating the limit of the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone. Japan argued that "since
there were no provisions in the Korea-Japan Convention concerning the rights of
hot pursuit, the question had to be regulated by the rules of general international
law, and that under international law, it was not recognized that a State can
exercise the right of hot pursuit starting from the exclusive zone. For a counter
argument, Korea claimed that "in any case the vessel had been fishing within the
exclusive fishery zone of Korea established under this convention, and that the
vessel could be caught in the exercise of the right of hot pursuit by the Korean
patrol boats." See Japanese practice in international law, 13 Jap. Ann. Int'l L. 8384 (1969). With regard to the same issue, on June 17, 1975, a United States District
Court, in the cases of United States v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Maru No. 281 and
United States v. Kawaguchi, held that "nothing in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone affirmatively prohibits a coastal state
from creating a contiguous zone for purposes other than the four enumerated
ones." The Court pointed out that "nothing in Article 24 of the Convention
precludes the establishment of such a zone for other purposes, including the
enforcement of domestic fisheries law." In the case, it is worth noting that Japan
did not protest with specific reference to hot pursuit originating in the contiguous
fisheries zone. For details, see U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings before
the Comm. on Armed Services, Extending Jurisdiction of the U.S. Over Certain
Ocean Areas 185 (1974); Fidell, "Hot Pursuit From a Fisheries Zone," 70 Am. J.
Int'l L. 95, 98, 99 (1976). Finally, the idea contained in the Informal Negotiating
Text of the 1975 Geneva session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference seems to
indicate the possible future guideline on the problem. Article 97(2) and (4) stipulate
that the right of hot pursuit shall apply not only to violations of the territorial sea
and the contiguous zone but also to those of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP/8/Part II, at 36 (1975).
144. Korea has been implementing a whaling license system to conserve whales
in the joint regulation zone and according to the Convention, Korea has been
maintaining the number of whale licenses as it was on the date of the Convention.
See M. Savini, Report on International and National Legislation {or the
Conservation of Marine Mammals: Part 1. International Legislation 57 (Rome,
1974), FAO, Doc. FIRD/C326 (1974).
145. The 8th Annual Meeting of the Korea-Japan Joint Fisheries Commission,
held at Tokyo on July 25 through July 28, 1973, reported that, except for the
stability of high level of mackerel, the productivities of the following fish: horse
mackerel, yellow corvenia, hail tail, shrimp and red sea beam, etc., showed gradual
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has been done in other fishery conventions, the conservation
measures depend on typical regulations concerning certain types
of fisheries (the dragnet fishing, seine fishing, and mackerelangling fishing), 146 and limiting the gross tonnage (not less than
60 tons), the number of fishing vessels, the size of mesh and the
power of the luring lights. In this respect, the Korean-Japanese
methods of regulation are not much different from the SinoJapanese methods. Both conventions are oriented to the power of
the vessel, i.e., the Korea-Japan convention concerns gross
tonnage and the Sino-Japanese agreement the horsepower, and
the other orthodox methods of conservation are identical in each
agreement.
The Korea-Japan convention contains a notable provision
relating to the so-called idea of "equal sharing" of sea resources.
Each contracting party is equally obliged not to land more than
150,000 tons of the above-mentioned three kinds of fish altogether
(map 6). 147 In this respect, it is questionable whether Korea, as a
coastal state, has been denied some sort of special interest
generally recognized by the international conventional rules and
practices. 148 In normal situations, it is unquestionable that most
of the fisheries agreements have given weight to the interests of
coastal states, when they allocate the amount of fish catch, the
fishing zones or the number of fishing vessels, etc. As earlier
shown, the Sino-Japanese agreements, all consistently gave a
favorable consideration to the interests of China. 149
In addition, the Convention has another remarkable provision
in relation to the estimation of the total annual quota of fish
catch. For that purpose, each party is obliged to report to the other
party at least four times every year the amount of fish monthly
caught in the zone. 150 Furthermore, the convention provides that if
the total amount of the annual fish catch is likely to exceed
150,000 tons with allowance of 10% or less, each government has
to administratively readjust the number of vessels or teams of
declines. It thus recognized the necessity for further studies and investigations of
the fisheries for reasonable evaluation as well as the need for specific reviews of
the rational management of fishery resources. See Korean Association of Fisheries
Technics, The Fisheries Annual of 1974 (in Korean) 64-65 (1974).
146. The mackerel is regarded as the most important fish in the joint regulation
zone.
147. Clause 2(a) of the Agreed Minute.
148. See Art. 8(1), of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas.
149. See supra, text accompanying notes 65-76.
150. Clause 2(c) of the Agreed Minute.
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fishing vessels even during the fishing periods in order to keep the
total annual catch of fish at not more than 165,000 tons. As a
result, the checking on the proper implementation of the annual
quotas remains principally under the voluntary control of each
party. It is thus questionable whether the main theme of the
convention, viz., the effectiveness of controlling the maximum
quota of annual fish catches, would be achieved as it was
originally intended.I5I

2. The Soviet-Japanese Convention
The fishing zones are to be designated according to the kinds
of fish stocks (salmon, king crab and herring), and a certain type
of fishing zones (prohibited areas) can be amended upon further
scientific evidence. The annual quota for the salmon catch in the
regulatory areas is to be determined by the Joint Fisheries
Commission. The Convention mainly concerns the salmon fishing
operations and thus sets up in detail the salmon fishing zones. As
regards the king crab fishing, two prohibited areas are set up but
there are not yet herring fishing areas.

Salmon Fishing Zones. These zones cover all the Northwest Pacific Ocean (including the Okhotsk and Bering Seas) and
are divided into the prohibited and regulatory area. The prohibited areas were primarily intended to cover any areas within 40
miles (40-mile prohibited areas) from the coastline of the islands
belonging to either party and from the continental coast within
the original convention area.l 52 As shown in map 7, the extent of
the prohibited areas is to be revised, if necessary, on the basis of
scientific evidence presented by the Soviet-Japan Fisheries
Commission. In 1957 the areas ranging 20 miles from the region
south of the 48th northern latitude were absorbed in the
prohibited areas, and in 1959 the entire Sea of Okhotsk and the
other areas adjoining the Commandorsky Islands and the Kuril
Islands were added to them. 153 As a result, up to 1962, the
prohibited areas for salmon fishing were expanded so as to
encompass the Sea of Japan north of the 45th northern latitude
and the Okhotsk Sea and the western part of the Bering Sea (map
151. For the effectiveness of the enforcing of the provisions, see infra, text
accompanying notes 164-71.
152. For the original convention area, see Clause 1(a) of the annex of the SovietJapanese Convention and for the 40-mile prohibited areas, see id., Clause 1(b).
153. Cf. the Soviet concept of "closed sea" at infra, text accompanying notes
202-5.
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7). In these areas, any Japanese salmon fishing operation is
prohibited throughout the year.

The Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Convention

(Map 7)
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In 1962, the Soviet-Japanese Commission agreed that the
regulatory areas (in fact the convention areas excluding the entire
prohibited areas) should be divided into two parts, Area A and
Area B (map 7). From then onward, the conservation measures in
the two areas have been adopted in terms of allocating the annual
quota of s~lmon catch and in terms of restricting the gross
tonnage of fishing vessels, the fishing period and the size of nets.
As for the salmon fishing period, the convention stipulated only
the closing date of the fishing period (August 10). But in 1957,
according to the type of fishing operations, the opening and
closing dates were fixed by the Commission as follows: (1) for
mothership operations in Area A, May 15-August 10; (ii) for driftnet operations in Area A by vessels operating from Japanese
ports, June 21-August 10; (iii) for drift-net and long-line opera-
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tions in A.rea B, by vessels operating from Japanese ports, April
30-June 30. 154

King Crab Fishing Zones. The convention had no
provisions concerning prohibited areas. Since 1958, however, a
king crab fishing prohibited area has been designated between 53
degrees and 51 degrees north longitude; and since 1959 the area
between 56 degrees 55 minutes and 56 degrees 20 minutes has also
been so designated. In other regulatory areas, the catching of
female crabs and small male crabs less than 13 centimeters in
carapace width is prohibited. But the incidental catch of such
crabs has been allowed, for example in 1957, at the ratio of onetenth each haul. In addition, the size of nets must be limited in
accordance with the decision of the Joint Commission.
Herring Fishing Zones. Actually all the convention areas
may be called herring fishing zones since herring fishing
operations are not prohibited in any place. Only the size of the
herring (originally less than twenty centimeters but twenty-one in
1958) is limited, and the incidental catch of the undersized herring
is only allowed up to 10% of the total catch per trip.
The Soviet-Japanese convention has never been concerned
with the power of the engine of fishing vessels for conservation
purposes. Yet the Sino-Japanese agreement has primarily given
consideration to this approach. Thus, the Sino-Japanese agreement intends to limit the maximum amount of annual fish
catches, among other things, by means of restricting horsepower,
while the Soviet-Japanese convention intends to do so by means
of fixing the annual quota.155
Salmon, the principal fish under the convention, is an
anadromous fish largely residing at the time of catch in the Soviet
territorial waters where the applicability of this convention is
excluded. Thus the Soviet-Japanese convention naturally protects
the coastal interest in favor of the Soviet Union since the annual
quota, a result of hard bargaining every year by the Fisheries
154. The relevant regulations apply only to a fixed percentage of the nets on
board. See FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Report on Regulatory Fishery Body 13 (Rome,
1972), FAO, Doc. F10/C/138 (1972).
155. For the control of the annual quota, the gross tonnage of fishing vessels
allowed has gradually been reduced from 180,400 tons in 1957 to 87,000 tons in
1975. For the same purpose, each state is obliged to issue licenses or certificates
allowing fishing operations in the convention areas to its own vessels and to
inform each other of all such licenses and certificates issued. See Art. V(2), the
Russo-Japanese Convention.
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Commission, will extend only to the convention areas, which
means that only Japanese fishermen will be affected by the
quota. Iss
In addition, the zonal approach in this case, such as closed
areas, closed season and limited tonnage and fish size, etc., is in
form similar to the zonal approach of the Sino-Japanese
agreement; in substance, however, the Soviet-Japanese approach
is much stricter than that under any other conventions under
discussion, since stronger enforcement measures are implemented
by the Soviet enforcing authorities. From the point of view of
effectiveness, the Soviet-Japanese zonal approach seems to be the
most effective of the conventions discussed here.

3.

The Tripartite Convention

The convention areas include all the waters of the North
Pacific Ocean. In regard to salmon fishing operations by the
United States and Japan, the convention areas were modified to
exclude the United States 12-mile fishery zone declared in 1966, in
accordance with the 1974 agreement between the United States
and Japan concerning salmon fishing. 157 The three parties (the
United States, Canada and Japan) agreed in principle that
salmon of North American origin in the North Pacific, halibut in
the Northeast Pacific, and herring stocks in the Northeast Pacific
satisfied the criteria for the so-called abstention principle. The
convention provides for an annual review of the extent to which a
certain stock of fish continues to qualify for abstention. 158
The abstention principle was formulated by drawing a line in
the Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean at meridian 175 degrees
west longitude, east of which Japan agreed to abstain from
fishing for salmon. The line was established on a provisional
basis subject to the later ecommendation of the Commission. In
1957 herring of Alaskan origin, and in 1962 halibut in the Bering
Sea, respectively, were removed from the abstantion formula since
they no longer met the criteria for the principle. 159 At the annual
meeting in. November 1974, Japan agreed to ban trawllng in
specified areas and periods during 1975 in the eastern Bering Sea
156. Otherwise, it would be questionable whether the convention would have
contained such provisions equally controlling the annual quotas of both parties.
157. Supra note 136.
158. Art III 1(a) and (b) of the Tripartite Convention.
159. For halibut in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Canada and the
United States signed in 1953 the Convention for Preservation of Halibut Fishery of
the Northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea, 222 U.N.T.S. 77 (1955).
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where halibut are taken in substantial quantities as an incidental
catch. 160 To a lesser extent, Canada also agreed to abstain from
fishing a certain kind of salmon within a certain convention area
of the Bering Sea east of the provisional line (map 8).1 61
The abstention principle 162 seems to largely represent the
"species approach" favored by the United States. This principle is
not directly comparable to the conservation measures under the
Sino-Japanese agreement, but the fishery fallow zones under the
Sino-Japanese agreement may be compared with the abstention
areas in light of prohibition of fishing operations. The most
convincing arguments for the principle seem to be that certain
stocks of fish are now being fully utilized as a result of keeping up
productivity through great expenditure of money and time, etc.,
and through restraints imposed by each party on its own
fishermen. But Japan may say that it will participate in the
conservation measures only as much as necessary for maintaining the present level of productivity and that beyond the zone it
should be allowed to fish on the basis of the free competition on
the high seas. Even in this zone, the conclusive criterion for
keeping the status quo between the conflicting interests seems to
tum on the special interest of the coastal state existing solely by
reason of the geographical vicinity.1sa
160. See Jacobs, supra note 137, at 486-7, especially n.75.
161. Protocol to the Tripartite Convention and Annex Clause 2, id. A proviso in
Article IV(l) provides for three exceptions not applicable to the abstention
principle with regard to: (1) any stock of fish under substantial exploitation by a
contracting state having conditions expressed in the section 2 of the same Article
during 25 years next preceding the entry into force of the Convention; (2) any stock
of fish harvested in greater part by a state or states not party to this Convention;
(3) and waters in which there is historic intermingling of the stocks of fish
exploited by these operations, and a long-established history of joint conservation
and regulation.
162. For comments on this principle, see Allen, "A New Concept for Fisheries
Treaties," 46 Am. J. lnt'l L. 319 (1952); Selak, "The Proposed International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific," 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 322
(1952); Commentary 5 to Art. 53, International Law Commission Draft (1956) of the
Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 230-1 (1957);
Bishop, "General Course of Public International Law," 115 Hague Academy of
Int'l L. Recueil des Course 316-7 (1965); Bishop, supra note 29, at 1222-28;
Johnson, supra note 135, at 22, 29-30 et seq.; Chapman, "The Theory and Practice
of International Fishery Development-Management," 7 San Diego L. Rev. 408, 438·39 (1970). For the dissenting opinions, see S. Oda, supra note 132, at 89; Japanese
practices of International Law, 11 Jap. Ann. lnt'l L. 91 (1967); Oda, supra note 126,
at 66-67.
163. Cf. Agreement Concerning Shrimp between the United States and Brazil
whereby the United States conceded a considerable interests in high seas fisheries
to Brazil, U.S.L.C. Congressional Research Service, supra note 136 at 629.
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B. Enforcement Mea9ures
First, the Sino-Japanese agreement has a special feature
which obliges ordinary fishing vessels to cooperate for enforcement purposes; this feature does not appear in the three North
Pacific fisheries conventions. Second, the Japanese-Korean
enforcement measures are not to be applied to the domestic trawl
and seine fishing ban areas of each state, even though some small
parts of the Korean domestic fishing ban areas in the south
extend slightly beyond the 12-mile exclusive fishery zone. Third, a
feature common to all the conventions is the exclusive jurisdiction
of the flag state in regard to prosecution and sanction.
On the question who is to enforce the convention, as shown
earlier, the Sino-Japanese agreement is silent; it provides only for
the right of each state to notify any violation to the other. 164
Under the Korean-Japanese convention, the right of control and
jurisdiction in the joint control zone is to be exercised only by the
flag state of the fishing vessels. 165 The Soviet-Japanese convention is silent on the question. The Tripartite convention provides
that enforcement may be carried severally or jointly. 166 However,
the provision does not explicitly prescribe how observers are to be
appointed in case of joint enforcement. Therefore, the effectiveness of ihe joint enforcement scheme under the Convention is
uncertain. The enforcing authority under the Korean-Japanese
convention is conferred specifically on "inspection ships" and
"authorized officials" of either party. 167 Finally, the SovietJapanese convention and the Tripartite convention merely
provide for "authorized officials" as an enforcing agency. 16B
When a "reasonable cause" is found as to a suspected
violation by a fishing vessel, the authorized officials under the
Korean-Japanese convention have merely the authority to notify
the infringements to the competent officials of the other state who
are on board their inspection ships. In other words, the right to
halt and inspect any suspected violators is entrusted only to the
flag state of the vessels. In the same situation, the SovietJapanese convention allows such officials to board and search the
164. In the absence of specific provisions, the general provision of Art. 6, para. 1
of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, relating to the jurisdiction of the flag
state, may be applicable.
165. Art. Vl(1).
166. Art. X(2).
167. Agreed Minute Clause 3(a).
168. Art. VII(1) of the Soviet-Japanese Convention; Art. X, 1(b) of the Tripartite
Convention.
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vessels. If the search yields evidence that the fishing vessel is
actually violating the convention, the convention allows the
officials to seize the vessel or arrest the crew. Under the Tripartite
convention such officials have the right to arrest or seize such
person or vessel if they were engaged in illegal operations before
the officials boarded the vessel. 169 In addition, the mere presence
of fishing vessels in the abstention areas is sufficient cause to
allow officials to board the vessels in order to inspect them and
question the crew on board. 170 Thus the enforcement measures
provided in the Tripartite convention are unusually strong and
may possibly give rise to a question about the requirement that
vessels suffer the minimum interference or inconvenience in the
course of fishing operations. Before starting to board or search
any suspected violators, the Soviet-Japanese convention and the
Tripartite conventions require inspectors to present credentials
issued by their government if requested by the master of the
vessel. 171 But the inspectors under the Korea-Japan convention
and the Sino-Japanese agreement are not asked to present their
identities since they are not authorized to board the suspected
vessel. It may not be true that Japanese fishermen tend to observe
treaty rules for the East Asian Seas more strictly than those for
the Northwest or North Pacific oceans. It is therefore highly
desirable that Chinese and Korean enforcing authorities receive
parity of powers with the American, Canadian and Soviet
authorities for the purpose of effective inspection of Japanese
fishermen.
Mter seizure or arrest of vessels or persons as a result of
evidenced violations, under the Tripartite convention, the state to
which the officials belong is required to notify the other state of
such seizure or arrest, and must immediately deliver the vessels or
persons to the authorized officials of the state to which such
vessels or persons belong at a place to be agreed upon by the two
states. If, however, the other party cannot accept the delivery and
request, the party giving such notification may keep such vessels
or persons under surveillance within its own territory, under the
conditions agreed upon by the contracting states. In the same
169. Art. X(1)(b).
170. Art. X(1)(a).
171. The incomplete functions of Korean or Japanese inspectors in relation to
finding a suspected violation are, in an agreed minute, a little more supplemented
by allowing inspectors of one state to board on the patrol ships of the other state,
and· by providing the authorized officials of the other state with opportunities and
data for inspection purposes.
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situation, the Soviet-Japanese convention requires immediate
delivery at the place of seizure or arrest unless another place is
agreed upon by the two states. If the other party cannot accept
such delivery and request, the convention imposes the aame
obligations as those under the Tripartite convention. In this
regard, the only difference between the two conventions is the
matter of choosing the place of delivery of arrested or seized
vessels. The Tripartite convention provides for the place of
delivery to be agreed upon, while the Soviet-Japanese convention
designates the place of seizure or arrest unless otherwise agreed.
This seems to indicate that the immediacy of delivering action
under the Soviet-Japanese convention may be better secured than
that under the Tripartite convention. The reason is that in the
event of an initial failure to the place of seizure or arrest is the
place of delivery under the former convention but another place
has to be agreed under the latter convention. In spite of such
strong enforcement tools, the effectiveness of policing the
Northwest and North Pacific fisheries has been frequently
questioned. 172 In this sense, the inarticulate provisions on the
enforcement measures under either: the Sino-Japanese or KoreaJapan conventions seem to make it even harder to determine or
deter infringements of the conventions on the spot.
With regard to imposing sanctions, the Sino-Japanese
agreement provides only that the flag state of vessels is obliged to
report the result of the action to the other state, while the other
three conventions require the flag state to impose penalties in
furtherance of domestic laws. 173 In particular, the Tripartite and
Korea-Japan conventions stipulate that each state must impose
equivalent penalties for the same violations. In regard to the
burden of proof, the Soviet-Japanese convention requires written
evidence and proof establishing the offense, while the Tripartite
convention provides for the presentation of witnesses and
evidence necessary for establishing the offense. 174 Both conventions lack provisions regarding what evidence or witnesses have
to be submitted but require only that they be submitted as
promptly as possible. 175 The Korea-Japan convention and the
172. See Jacobs, supra note 137, at 488.
173. Art. 3(2), the Sino-Japanese agreement; Art. Vl(4), the Soviet-Japanese
convention; Art. XI(c), the Tripartite convention.
174. Art. VII(3), the Soviet-Japanese convention; id. the Tripartite convention.
175. Cf. Art. 9(11), the Scheme of Joint Enforcement and the Conduct
Convention of 1967, which provides, in part, that ... no state would be required to
submit higher evidential value than it would possess. For the text, see 6 Int'l Legal
Mats 760 (1967).
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Sino-Japanese agreement have no provision relating to the burden
of proof.

C. Fisheries Commission
There are several features shared by the joint commissions
under the Sino-Japanese agreement and the other North Pacific
conventions, even though the substance of each common characteristic is not identical. In regard to voting procedure, the
requirements are similar. Under the Tripartite convention, a
unanimous vote is required if the matters are related to all three
contracting states, but if they are concerned with two of the states
a unanimous vote is not necessarily required. The Sino-Japanese
agreement, the Soviet-Japanese convention and the Korea-Japan
convention require only a mutual agreement or concurrence. 176
Normally it may be said that fishery commissions do not
possess supranational authority and thus the conservation
measures they formulate and adopt are not directly binding on
individual fishermen without local legislation. 177 This is true to
the extent that recommendation is the key function performed by
all the Commissions under consideration and the decision-making
function is confined only to certain fields. 178 The power to make
decisions usually concerns technical matters such as the rules of
procedure and the conduct of meetings. 179 Any broad decisionmaking function would thus constitute an exception to the
generally recommendatory authority of a fisheries commission.
The Commission under the Sino-Japanese agreement may
review matters concerning the fishery control measures; if
necessary, the Commission may recommend to the contracting
states a revision of the conservation measures. The contracting
governments may revise such measures by means of an exchange
of notes accepting the Commission's recommendation. Another
function of the Commission is to exchange fishery data and to
176. See Art. 6(2) of the Sino-Japanese agreement; Art. VI(3) of the Korea-Japan
convention; Art. III(3} of the Soviet-Japanese convention; and Art. Il(3) of the
Tripartite convention.
177. See G. Knight, supra note 44 at 687.
178. For a general discussion of the recommendation and decision functions,
see Burke, "Aspects of Internal Decision-Making Processes in Intergovernmental
Fishery Commissions," 43 Wash. L. Rev. 116, 169-74 (1967).
179. Except for the Sino-Japanese Agreement, the other three conventions lay
down identical provisions which read as follows: "the Commission may decide
upon and revise, as occasion may require, rules for the conduct of its meetings."
For an example, see Art. Vl(4), the Korea-Japan convention.
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review the current status of fisheries in the fishing zones. In
addition, if necessary, the Commission may review matters
concerning the preservation of fishery resources and related
problems, and it may recommend to the two states measures to be
taken as a result of such review. Thus the Sino-Japanese
agreement does not confer on the Commission any decisionmaking authority and it is only empowered to make recommendations which have binding force on member states.
The function of the Commission under the Korean-Japenese
convention lies between the Sino-Japanese Commission on the
one hand the Soviet-Japanese and the Tripartite Commissions on
the other hand. In regard to the conservation measures enforced
in the fishing zones, the Korea-Japan Commission is authorized to
review and, if necessary, recommend to the contracting states new
measures. The recommendation concerning new measures may
include proposals for a revision of the current conservation
measures. 180 However, the Commission is not empowered to decide
directly on any new measures. Furthermore, the contracting states
are not obliged to accept all the recommendations made by the
Commission; they are only required to respect the recommendations to the extent possible. Thus the recommendatory function of
the Korean-Japanese Commission is just about the same as that
of the Sino-Japanese Commission. In that regard, the SovietJapanese is authorized not only to consider and to revise, if
necessary, the coordinated measures upon the scientific basis, but
also authorized to make recommendations to the contracting
states concerning conservation and increase of fishery resources.
The most important function performed by the Soviet-Japanese
Commission is that the Commission is given legal authority to
determine the annual quotas of fish catches. 1 B1 These quotas are
binding on each member state upon notification. On the same
matter, in the Tripartite convention the Commission may
determine to continue the abstention principle in relation to fish
specified in the annex; it may also decide to apply or cease to
apply the abstention principle to other stocks of fish. 182 Such
determinations must be based, in the first place, on scientific
evidence and then must be accompanied by a consideration of the
180. Art. VII(a) and (c).
181. Art. IX(b). Salmon is the only stock the total amount of the catch of which
shall be determined by the Commission.
182. It was, however, understood that no determination or recommendation is
to be made for 5 years after the entry into force of this convention. See Art. III(l)(a)
and (b).
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effect of strikes, wars or exceptional economic or biological
conditions. 183 Another key function is to determine whether the
stock of fish under control of the abstention formula is being fully
utilized since the current full utilization of fish is an important
ground for justification of the principle. Moreover, the Tripartite
Commission is authorized to decide and recommend the need for
joint conservation with regard to any stock of fish under
substantial exploitation by two or more contracting states, and
not covered by a conservation agreement between the parties at
the time of conclusion of the convention. The Commission is also
entitled to request the contracting states to report regularly the
conservation measures taken for the stocks of fish specified in the
annex. Recommendations made by the Tripartite Commission are
not directly binding on member states. Instead, member states
recognized only the desirability of such recommendations and the
necessity of imposing restraints on their nationals and fishing
vessels in conformity with the recommendations. Thus, recommendations have only an advisory function to member states.
In regard to the legal capacity conferred upon the Commissions, only the Tripartite convention empowers the Commission to
employ personneP 84 and acquire facilities and to utilize the
technical and scientific services from any public or private
institution of the contracting states and their political subdivisions. Other questions concerning the privileges and immunities
of the commissions in the course of performing their missions in
each contracting state have not been answered by any of the
conventions under discussion. 1B5
Another important function of fisheries commissions is to
study and secure information in order to serve as a basis for
decision, recommendation or general policy. Except for the SinoJapanese agreement, the conventions under consideration all
stipulate the intelligence functions of their commissions. The
Korean-Japanese convention provides that the Commission is to
compile and study records and to review the necessary matters
concerning· conservation measures, while the Soviet-Japanese
convention provides that for the purpose of studying the fishery
resources, the Commission is to prepare and adjust coordinated
183. Art. IX 1(b)(ii) and 2.
184. Art. 11(13).
185. Cf. the legal capacity of the International Pacific Halibut Commission
within the United States. It is designated as an international public organization
entitled to privileges and immunities, and it possesses the capacity to make
contracts, to acquire and dispose of property, and to bring suit. See 22 U.S. C. § 288
(1964).
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scientific research programs. The Tripartite convention requires
the Commission, first, to study specified stocks of fish, in order to
determine whether they meet certain abstention conditions
provided for one or two of the parties, or to determine whether
there is a need for joint conservation measures. Second, the
Commission is obliged to investigate the waters of the convention
area to determine whether there are areas in which salmon
originating in the rivers of Canada and of the United States
intermingle with salmon originating in the rivers of Asia. Third,
the Commission is required to conduct further studies with the
purpose of recommending new areas in which the exploitation of
salmon should be forbidden by abstention. Lastly, the Commission is to compile data and study records which it might obtain
from the parties and to submit reports of its activities to the
parties.
.
In general, gathering information and planning studies are
essential to all the rest of the functions of fisheries commissions.
The authority and responsibility for information gathering and
planning are different among the commissions. This information
and study function is usually decentralized and given to a
subcommittee or special panel. For example, the Korean-Japanese
Commission is authorized to establish its own research program
without consulting the agencies of the two member governments.
In accordance with such a research program, the Subcommittee
on Fishery Resources is to conduct research and information
activities and to report them to the Commission. But the Tripartite
Commission is to establish the research program in general
outline only, after consulting the agencies of the three member
states. The major intelligence function is undertaken in various
committees. The two major committees involved are the Committee on Biology and Research and the Ad Hoc Committee on
Abstention. 1 B6

D. Maritime Stecurity Zone
The problem of protecting the maritime security interests is
one of the difficulties to be solved in the law of the sea
186. See Int'l North Pacific Fisheries Comm'n, [1974] Proceeding of the 21st
Annual Meeting 119-26, 277-85 (1974). In this regard, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) is the only world-wide organization performing intelligence
functions on fisheries. See FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Report on FAO, the FAO
Committee on Fisheries and International and Regional Fishery Bodies 9-11
(1975), FAO Doc. FID/C/331.
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conferences. In short, two conflicting interests are involved: (1)
free transit of straits and narrower territorial waters, 187 and (2)
broader national sovereignty over the areas. 188
As a national expression of this interest, Japan first instituted
maritime security zones in accordance with the Imperial Act of
1907, which extended to a distance of seven miles beyond the
territorial waters. 189 Currently, there are about 20 maritime
security zones in the world under the names of neutrality zones,
defense zones and marine control zones. 190 In 1917, the United
States and Panama proclaimed certain "defensive sea areas,"
some of which were later discontinued. During World War II, the
nations of the Western Hemisphere purported to establish a
"neutrality zone" for continental protection (the Declaration of
Panama of 1939). In the early 1950's, China designated three
military areas for the sake of defense security. In 1952, a Korean
sea defense zone was established around the Korean Peninsula. In
1950 and 1951, respectively, United States and Canadian air
defense identification zones were promulgated.
The Chinese military zones are unique in view of their
acceptance in the bilateral fisheries agreement. Thus, it seems
worth discussing the legality of the zones and the relation
between the security right and the fishing right. The issues
involved herein are so delicate and important that lengthy
discussions are needed. At this point, however, only a brief
comment will be made on the issues, after looking at some state
practices on the matter.
187. See Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," 37 Foreign Affairs 83-86 (1958); Jessup,
"The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," Columbia Essays in Int'l L. 201
(1965); Janis, "The Soviet Navy and Ocean Law" U.S. Naval War College Review
52 (Mar.·Apr. 1974); for the particular U.S. position, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.86 (1974); Osgood, "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," 2
Ocean Deuel. and Int'l L. J. 1, particularly 3-4 (1974).
188. For example, see Anand, "The Tyranny of the Freedom of the Seas
Doctrine," 12 Int'l Studies 416 (1973); for particular positions of some developing
states, see U.N. Doc. AtCONF.62/C.2/L.4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19, etc. (1974).
189. For details, see Tausing, "Territorial Control and Jurisdiction over Sea
Area," 71 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 6 at 815-23 (1945).
190. See lvanashehinko, "Concerning Marine Security Areas," found in The
Legal Regime of the World Ocean 121-2 (M. Lazarev and V. Tkachenko, eeL 1973);
for state practices, see Int'l L. Comm'n Second Report on the Regime of the
Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/61 at 11-24 (1953); and for numerical show of
state practices on the functional zone claims beyond 3 miles, see III H. Lay, R.
Churchill & M. Nordquist, New Directions in the Law of the Sea 165-6 (1973).
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1. Chinese Military Zone
In the early 1950's, China unilaterally designated three areas
on the high seas adjacent or along its coast as "military areas" for
the purpose of defense security and military necessity. 1 9 1 All the
three zones were incorporated into the non-governmental arrangements, but the Military Navigational Zone has been discontinued
since December 22, 1975 in conformity with the present governmental agreement. The Military Navigational Zone was situated
in the coastal waters south of Shanghai wherein no vessel was
admitted at any time (map 4). Thus, the Chinese military zones
currently in force are as follows:
(1) In the Military Security Zone on the northern part of the
Yellow Sea, all vessels can enter only with the permission of the Chinese Authorities concerned; and
(2) in the Military Operational Zone in the waters north of
Taiwan and south of 29°N, vessels are advised not to
fish, otherwise they should bear risks arising from their
entries (map 5).
In principle, China seems to think that any coastal state may
establish its marine security zone whenever it deems it necessary.
From the Chinese viewpoint, in reality, the physical environment
in relation to North-South Korea is in such a stance that China
would feel some potential threat to its security in the Yellow Sea
and the East China Sea because of complications in political
relations among the countries to which peace in the Korean
Peninsula is an important security concern.
In legal terms, the provision of the military zones raises the
crucial issue of whether the zones are applicable only to Japanese
fishing vessels or all vessels regardless of nationality. When
Japan accepted the military zones with an understanding that
"the regulation of the zones shall be applied to all vessels
regardless of nationality," China acquiesced in it without any
condition. In contract terms, the Japanese acceptance with
understandings (conditions) may be regarded as a counteroffer.
Since the Japanese counteroffer was accepted without any
modification, the contract (treaty) should be interpreted in
accordance with the terms. As a result, it seems appropriate to
understand the issue in the sense that Japanese fishing vessels as
191. For the background of the Chinese experience in the security issue in the
early 20th century, see J. Wheeler-Bennett et al., Information on the Problem of
Security (1917-1926) 210-18 (1927).
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well as other vessels regardless of nationality and mission would
be controlled by the regulation of the Chinese military zones when
they entered the zones. 192
2. Korean Sea Defense Zone
The Sea Defense Zone was proclaimed in September 1952 by
the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea during the
height of the Korean War and thus the line of its delimitation was
sometimes called the "Clark Line" after the Commander's name
(map 9). 193 It encircled the Korean coastal waters within the Peace
(Rhee) Line limits starting at a point twelve miles offshore from
the Soviet border on the east and reaching a point twelve miles
from the Manchurian border on the west. The zone existed for
eleven months. In August 1953, it was suspended due to the
Armistice Agreement prohibiting coastal blockade. 194
As a war-time measure, the defense zone had two main
purposes. One was to safeguard the Korean coastline and the
communication lines of the United Nations forces. The other was
to suspend trouble between Korean police patrol ships and
Japanese fishing vessels that crossed over what was then called
the "MacArthur Line" and later the "Peace Line" which divided
Korean and Japanese waters. According to the Proclamation, all
ships were to be subject to search by the United Nations forces if
they entered the blockade. Japanese fishing vessels also were
completely barred from entering it.
Japan and the Soviet Union immediately protested against
the Proclamation of the Zone. 195 In a legal sense, it is interesting
to note the difference between the Japanese and Soviet protests.
Japan argued that the zone as specified in the announcement had
nothing to do with fishing rights. But the Soviet Union basically
denied that a belligerent had the right 196 in time of war to
establish a security zone on the high seas close to shores.
192. See Cheng, supra note 46, at 64; Bethill, "People's China and the Law of
the Sea," 8 Int'l Lawyer, 1724, 741 (1974).
193. See M. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu 154 (1954).
194. See Art. 2(15), Korean Armistice Agreement, signed at Panmunjom, Korea,
on July 27, 1952.
195. For the Japanese and Soviet protests and the United States State
Department's answer to the Soviet protest, see Clark supra note 193, at 156, 155-6,
respectively. For further discussions, see infra, text accompanying note 206.
196. For the belligerent rights in this area, see B. Williams, State Security and
the League of Nations 43, et seq. (1927); Henkin, "Changing Law for the Changing
Seas," Uses of the Seas 86-7 (the American Assembly, Col. Uni. ed. 1968); W.
Bishop, supra note 34, at 393-7; and B. Brittin and L. Watson, International Law
for Seagoing Officers 227 (3rd ed. 1972).
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3. Other State Practices

Latin America. In October 1939, the American Republics
(including the United States) adopted the "Declaration of
Panama." The Declaration referred to the past proposals during
the World War of 1914-18, by which the Governments of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru had urged
belligerents to refrain from hostile acts near the shores of
America, and it referred to the protection needed for a "zone of
security including all the normal maritime routes of communication and trade between the countries of America." The Declaration
claimed that the American republics were, as of inherent right,
entitled to have those waters free from any hostile act by any nonAmerican belligerent nation. 197
The legal issue involved in the neutral zone is how to reconcile
jurisdictions between belligerents and neutral states. In state
practice, there· is evidence that neutral states may exercise
jurisdiction over foreign vessels beyond the territorial limits to
safeguard their national defense. Yet the belligerent may visit and
search neutral craft, may capture enemy merchant ships, and
may attack enemy warships on the high seas. 198 In this situation,
another serious issue would be whether the neutral states had the
ability to control the entire neutral zone effectively.
United States and Canada. In the United States, there
were thirty-three defensive sea areas in force between 1917 and
1918. With one exception of one area (off the coast of North
Carolina), they were all outside the United States continent. Those
areas have generally been limited to the territorial waters. During
World War II there were 17 maritime control zones. Pursuant to
the Anti-Smuggling Act of August 5, 1935, customs enforcement
areas were set up. In addition, there were some harbors closed to
foreign vessels. But they were all discontinued either in 1945 or in
1946. 199
197. For the text of the Declaration, see U.S. Naval War College, 1939
International Law Situation with Solutions and Notes 66-8 (1940); 1 Dep't State
Bull. 331-3 (1939).
198. For comments on the Declaration, see U.S. Naval War College, id. at 60-8;
Masterson, "The Declaration of the Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law," 26
A.B.A.J. Int'l L. 112 (1940). Concerning general collective security issues, see
McNair, "Collective Security," 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 150 (1936). For the United
States position on the matter, see 7 Hackworth, International Law 703 (1943).
199. 46 U.S. Naval War College, 1948-49 International Law Documents 157-77
(1950); N. Padefold, Public Policy for the Seas (Rev. ed.) 31-2 (1970).
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In 1950 and 1951 the United States and Canada promulgated
Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ and CADIZ) for security
purposes in the air spaces over the domestic and coastal areas of
the United States and Canada. 200 Both the Canadian and United
States legislation have the same aim, national security, and both
seek to achieve it by the same general method. In a legal sense,
the main differences between the United States and Canadian
ADIZs are: First, the United States regulations do not impose any
altitude limitation for flights entering the Atlantic ADIZ, though
a 4000 feet limitation is imposed in the other United States ADIZ.
The Canadian ADIZ regulations apply only to flights at or above
4000 feet; second, the Canadian ADIZ applies to any aircraft
entering a CADIZ, while the United States ADIZ applies only to
aircraft destined for the United States. As regard the legality of
the zones under international law, it was argued that the
Canadian and the United States security regulations would be
justified on the basis of self-preservation. 201

The Soviet Union. The Soviet Union established fortified
zones in certain areas contiguous to the Union. It is not explicit
about the maximum limit of the zones. All merchant vessels,
whether of U.S.S.R. or foreign nationality, are not allowed to enter
without previous permission. All vessels proceeding through a
fortified zone are required to observe special rules provided by the
Soviet Union. 202 In addition, "Soviet writers claimed, with
approval of their government, that certain seas bordering the
Soviet Union were closed. Included in this category are the Black
200. For the text of the Executive Order Concerning United States Security
Control of Air Traffic, see 51 U.S. Naval War College, [1956] International Law,
Situation and Documents 579-92 (B. MacChesney ed. 1957); for the Canadian
Rules for the Security Control of Air Traffic, see id. at 592-600.
201. For the theoretical justification of the zones, authors have invoked the
difference between right of self-defence and right of self-preservation, which means
that the exercise of self-defence by a state must be accompanied by the imminent
danger of attack before taking measures for its protection, while the concept of selfpreservation is not so strict and would permit preventive measures for the safety of
the state. For details, see Martial, "State Control of the Air Space Over the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," 30 Can. B. Rev. 245, 263 (1952); J.
Murchison, The Contiguous Air Space Zone in International Law 55, et seq. (1956).
202. The first notices to mariners concerning rules for navigation in the
Fortified Zones were issued in 1955 and they were amended in part by the Notices
to Mariners of January 1, 1967. For the texts of the two Notices, see 2 U.N. Leg.
Ser., Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 263-4 (1957), U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1956); 1 H. Lay, R. Churchill, and M. Nordquist, New
Directions in the Law of the Sea 32-4 (1973), respectively.
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Sea, Caspian Sea, and Baltic Sea. The Soviet 'Sea of Peace'
campaign concerning the Baltic Sea was essentially a program to
'neutralize' that sea by declaring it out of bounds to warships of
all countries except those bordering on it." 203 Many Soviet jurists
also consider the Okhotsk Sea to be both a closed and historic sea
and would prohibit the navigation of foreign warships therein. 204
As regard the Sea of Japan, the Soviet Union proposed in the
draft U.S.S.R. peace treaty with Japan to close the straits leading
into the Sea to the warships of non-contiguous states. 205

Comment. In the modern context, most of the marine
security zones were instituted in furtherance of wartime measures.
They are not directly related to the fishing rights of the neutral
vessels since such fishing operations are, in most cases, excluded
from those areas in time of war. In a practical sense, it seems
doubtful whether neutral fishing vessels are entitled to claim
affirmatively their fishing rights vis-a-vis the security rights of
coastal states on the high seas relatively close to the shores, when
the coastal states are engaged in hostile activities. But it seems
another question whether vessels used exclusively for fishing
along the coast should be exempt from capture by the belligerent,
no matter whether the fishing vessels are enemy or neutral. 206
It is, in any event, highly desirable that the conflicting
interests between security uses and other uses such as fishing,
navigation or "really pure" scientific research, etc. are to be
minimized by using such criteria as reasonableness and relativity.207 In a prize case, the United States Supreme Court, invoking
203. B. Brittin and L. Watson, supra note 197, at 143; W. Butler, The Law of
Soviet Territorial Waters 19-24 (1967).
204. Id. at 79.
205. Pravda, Sept. 7, 1951, cited in id.
206. Compare Art. 21 and 22 of the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of
Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, found in 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 361 (1939), with
Art. 3 of the 11th Hague Convention of 1907 on Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War, signed at Hague, on October 18, 1907, found in 1 C. Bevans,

Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America
1776-1949, 719 (1968); for the right of requisitioning of neutral ships, see the
Proclamation of President Wilson, found in 6 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law 648-9 (1943); Bullock, "Angary," 3 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 99 (1922-23); for the
general discussions on the international law of neutrality, see Kunz, "Neutrality
and the European War, 1939-40," 39 Mich. L. Rev. 719 (1941); 2 L. Oppenheim,
International Law 287-447a (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952); 11 Whiteman, International Law 138-475 (1968); and Bishop, supra note 34, at 1034.
207. See P. Rao, The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the
Contemporary Law of the Sea 171 (1975).
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the international precedents and authorities on the subject, held,
in 1900, that "coastal fishing vessels, with their implements and
supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their
peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt
from capture as prize of war." 20 B This judgment contains criteria
by which such security versus non-security interests ought to be
resolved.
In reality as applied to the East Asian seas (or elsewhere), no
clear answer may be made as to how far coastal states may
exercise their security jurisdiction over the neutral fishing vessels
in time of "quasi-hostility" or cease-fire. A Chinese claim that her
military zones are an expression of sovereign right seems
excessive, since sovereignty on the high seas is accompanied by
an obligation prohibiting an abuse of right. But if China relied on
the theory of self-preservation rather than on that of self-defence,
it would be in a secure position for arguing the pros and cons in
an academic forum. As earlier interpreted, Chinese enforcement of
the regulation of the military zones on all foreign vessels could
impair the legal rights of third nations. Under international law
no treaty has binding effect on a third party without the consent
of the latter. This issue, however, has never been tested. Lastly, it
is to be pointed out that the current Conference on the Law of the
Sea seems not to pay much attention to the specific problems
involved in the maritime security zones. 209
VI. CONCLUSION

If the economic zone concept 210 is adopted on a universal

basis, the entire East Asian Seas will fall under the 200-mile limit
of the respective coastal states. In geographical sense, therefore,
Japan would be completely excluded from the Chinese and Korean
economic zones in the Yellow Sea. In the East China Sea and the
Sea of Japan, Japanese fishermen would be allowed to enter only
their section of the economic zone divided by median lines
between the respective neighboring states. This also m_eanl? that
208. This was a case of condemning two Spanish fishing vessels and cargos as
prize of war. For details, see the Paquete Habana and The Lola, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); for a treaty provision, see the first part of Art. 3 of the 11th Hague
Convention of 1907, cited in supra note 206.
209. See Osgood, supra note 187, at 31-6.
210. At the outset, it should be noted that the important issues which have
arisen with respect to the economic zone have not yet been compromised by the
negotiating nations. For details, see Taft, "The Third U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference: Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues," 14 Col. J. Transnat'l L. 112, 113
(1975).
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Japanese fishermen would be excluded from the agreed fishing
zones (including the Chinese military and conservation zones)
under either the Sino-Japanese or the Korea-Japan agreement. 211
Thus, it is assumed that the present level of Japanese fishing
participation in the region would be affected by the new limit even
if it is coupled with the concept of full utilization of living
resources 212 and by the policies of the respective coastal states
toward the limit.
According to statements presented in the current sessions of
the Law of the Sea Conference, China and North Korea, in
principle, adhere to rigid exclusivity of jurisdiction within the
zone, while South Korea and Japan basically support the concept
of the zone coupled with the full utilization principle. With regard
to the Sino-Japanese fishing relations, two things may be
predicted. First, China might extend the limit of fishing areas
regulated under the Sino-Japanese agreement by the influence of
the economic zone concept since the present agreement does not
prejudice the position of the two states on jurisdiction over the
seas. Second, in addition to the horsepower limit, China might
take advantage of the new zone for banning larger Japanese
fisheries companies from participating in the Yell ow and East
China Seas, allowing only smaller fisheries firms to operate in the
regions. With respect to Japanese-Korean fishing relations, the
two states have met a new era. Recently there emerged a reverse
trend whereby Japanese coastal fishermen have begun to be
adversely affected by the presence of Korean fishermen operating
off the coasts of Japanese islands of Hokkaido and Honshu. The
Korean-Japanese convention does not cover these areas. The
Japanese Government therefore asked the Korean Government for
three things: (1) self-restraints on the fishing operation by Korean
fishermen, (2) establishment of a dispute settlement commission
on a non-governmental basis, (3) and conclusion of a new
agreement to deal with the matters such as prevention of marine
incidents and emergency rescue, which arise from the new trend.
211. For a general view of the impact, see Alexander and Hodgson, "The
Impact of the 200-mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea," 12 San Diego L.
Rev. 569 (1975); for a short view of the impact on the East Asian Seas, see
Johnston, "Some Treaty Law Aspects of A Future International Fishing
Convention," in The Future of International Fisheries Management 103, 138-46
(G. Knight ed. 1975); Park, "Marine Resource Conflicts in the North Pacific"
(publication pending).
212. See Johnston, "Regional Consequences of a Global Fisheries Convention," in Fisheries Conflicts in the North Atlantic: Problems of Management and
Jurisdiction 36-8 (G. Pontecorvo ed. 1974).
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Such newly emerging situations and the hypothesis of the
economic zone concept would lead the two governments to review
the overall problems relating to readjustment of the KoreanJapanese convention. 21 3
If no international agreement is reached on the economic
zone, it seems likely that China would probably respect the first
three-year duration of the Sino-Japanese agreement without being
much influenced by the newly emerging state practices extending
fishing limits to 200 miles. The reason would be that the accord
was ratified at the time when the world-wide consensus on the
economic zone was already evident. On the other hand, it does not
seem likely that Korea would request a substantial revision of the
Korean-Japanese convention in order to utilize the new limit since
Korea would not want to weaken its position with other states in
relation to distant-water fishing. It seems probable, however, that
Korea would reinforce its position on the coastal jurisdiction for
specific purposes such as security or more strict conservation, etc.
In short, if (1) the Conference adopts the treaty but Japan does not
sign it and (2) the Conference cannot reach any agreement, it does
not seem likely that, ignoring the world-wide evidence in favor of
the new limit and the recently unilateral or regional extensions of
the limit by several states such as Canada, the European
Common Market Countries, the United States, and the Soviet
Union, Japan would challenge its neighbors' extensions of coastal
jurisdiction in the same manner as it contested the Korean Peace
(Rhee) Line in the 1950's and early 1960's. 214
The impacts of the new limit on the coastal state's economy
would not be identical in all situations. In general, China and
North Korea, which do not have distant-water fleets, seem likely
to increase their fish catches because there would be less
competition within their coastal areas. But in the short term,
Japan, South Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan, with
significant distant-water fleets, would be adversely affected
because their distant-water fleets' fishing would be restricted by
213. For the other view, see Johnston, supra note 211, at 142.
214. Japan itself already announced a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone.
However, Japan may rely on the concept of "historic right" to continue fishing
operations in the regions. But the continuing validity of the concept does not seem
to be certain. For details, see L. Alexander, Offshore Geography of Northwestern
Europe 101-4 (1966); for comment on the I.C.J. ruling on the concept in the United
Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, see Churchill, ''The
Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the International Court of
Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries Rights," 24 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 82,
98 (1975).
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the new limit. In the long tenn, however, the three countries would
recover their temporary decline of fishing industry by reorganizing their domestic fisheries managements into more commercially
profitRhle forms, and by expanding fisheries joint ventures with
foreign states which want to lease fishing rights within their
economic zcnes. It is not entirely improbable that the current
fisheries regulations in the East Asian region, which are solely
based on biological goals such as catch quotas, closed areas,
closed seasons and other restrictions on the sizes of fish, vessel
and gear, etc., might be combined with some new managerial
schemes, if the latter prove more efficient in fish catches in other
regions.
The extensive use of the economic zone without the coastal
state's exercising its responsibility 215 for preventing environmental deterioration would eventually contribute to the realization of
the common need to establish regional controls for pollution
abatement. The flow of the North Equatorial Current (black
current) is regular and directional in the South and East China
and Yellow Seas. 216 A coastal pollution is therefore likely to
disseminate in the entire region. This environmental physical
element might sei ve as a factor by which all the coastal states
would be forced to cope with pollution problems together in
disregard of ideological and political differences in the region.
The fisheries conflicts in the economic zone might not be
satisfactorily ended without solving disputes over non-living
resources in the continental shelf. 217 The continental shelves of
the Yellow and East China Seas are considered as potential areas
for oil and gas deposits. Thus, controversies between the coastal
states over the shelf limits have been heated. In general, the limit
of the economic zone based on the distance concept might help to
soften the pending disputes based on other geographical factors
such as the idea of natural prolongation of land mass and the
median line principle. In part, it is assumed that Japan and South
Korea are likely to develop jointly a shelf area overlapped by their
unilateral claims in accordance with a new agreement concerning
joint devel<)pment, 218 without being much influenced by the new
economic zone limit.
215. In the East Asian areas, the regional controls of marine pollution are
virtually non-existing; there is a "vacuum" in this respect.
216. See supra text accompanying note 9.
217. See E. Jones, Law of the Sea: Oceanic Resources 82-84 (1972).
218. The Agreement was signed at Se<>ul, on January 30, 1974. Korea already
ratified it. Finally, the Japanese Diet acted on the ratification of the Agreement on
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From the security point of view, the East Asian seas are
regarded as one of the regions susceptible to international power
politics. As shown, since the first Sino-Japanese nongovernmental fisheries arrangement in 1955, Japan has accepted
the Chinese military zones in accordance with the previous nongovernmental and current governmental agreements. Late in
October 1975, South Korea unilaterally banned Japanese fishing
operations in its demilitarization line waters in the Yellow Sea
and the Sea of Japan, declaring them to be "waters contacting the
enemies." 219 In consequence, it seems likely that the geographical
feature arising from the region's character as a semi-enclosed
sea, 220 the susceptibility to international politics, and the state
practices in the region might possibly lead to tighter security
regulations as the coastal jurisdiction expands further.22I
Even if the Law of the Sea Conference successfully adopts the
international conservation measures, such a formulation might
not provide specific guidelines appropriate for and applicable to
every region of the oceans. It is already known that prevention of
waste of fisheries economy might be achieved by removing the
condition of free and open access to the oceans and by limiting the
amount of fishing efforts. 222 Moreover, the existing bilateral
schemes might not comprehensively deal with the future regional
problems which will arise from the extensive use of the economic
zone. In order to avoid conflicts and achieve better economic
goals, it seems highly desirable that each state in the region

May 28, 1977. Thus, the Japanese ratification would be in effect as of June 8, 1977.
See Tong-A flbo at 1 (May 31, 1977). This Agreement would unprecedentedly open
an era of a resource cooperation between the two States. What results the
persistent Chinese protest to it would bring about, however, remain to be seen.
219. The Korea Herald, at 3 (January 6, 1976).
220. For the character of regional arrangements in semi-enclosed seas, see
Alexander and Hodgson, supra note 211, at 598.
221. For susceptibility of these regions, see Osgood, supra note 187, at 12.
222. For details, see F. Christy, Jr. Alternative Arrangements for Marine
Fisheries: An Overview 16, et seq. (1973). A report of the FAO Dep't of Fisheries
shows that in the Yellow and East China Seas the stocks of both demersal and
pelagic fish are probably close to being fully exploited, though the statistical and
other data are not reliable, and that it is likely that some increase in sustained
catch could be obtained from further management measures, especially those
based on better scientific and statistical data. For details, see FAO Dep't of
Fisheries, Review of the Status of Some Heavily Exploited Fish Stocks 11-2 (1973),
FAO, Doc. FID/C/313 (1973); FAO Dep't of Fisheries, Review of the Status of
Exploitation of the World Fish Resources 7-9 (1974), FAO Doc. FIRS/C328 (1974).
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should be ready to discuss an effective regional agreement. 22 ·1
Regional arrangements would, of course, require some modification of national jurisdiction and less emphasis on ideology
between conflicting states. But the appropriate regional arrangement probably would better serve the interests of the region as a
whole as well as those of each coastal state in the long run since
such arrangements would deal with problems arising out of
similar interests by means of regional uniformity by which
conflicts would be reduced and fair benefit and treatment would
be received by all. The regional rule seems more desirable in the
light of the idea that a well-formed legal channel will reduce
political and economic pressures existing between the larger and
smaller states and will enable such disputes to be solved by the
principle of equality before the law. 224
223. For a discussion of the regional agreements, see Bishop, supra note 162, at
1206-7; Johnston, supra note 137, at 102; Ottenheimer, "Patterns of Development
in International Fishery Law," 11 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 37, 40 (1973).
224. This idea was suggested by an author while discussing problems relating
to dispute-settlement. For details, see Sohn, "Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of
the Law of the Sea Convention," 12 San Diego L. Rev. 495, 516 (1975).

